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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 970099-CA
Priority No. 2

TROY LABRUM,
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 provides:
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
-- Enhanced penalties.
(1)
(a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used
in this section means the defendant and two or more
other persons would be criminally liable for the
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2)
(a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if
an indictment is returned, shall cause to be
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases
or the information or indictment in felony cases
notice that the defendant
is subject
to the
enhanced penalties provided under this section.
The notice shall be in a clause separate from and
in addition to the substantive offense charged.
(b)
If
the
subscription
is
not
included
initially, the court may subsequently allow the
prosecutor to amend the charging document to
include the subscription if the court finds the
charging documents, including any statement of
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of
the allegation he committed the offense in concert
with two or more persons, or if the court finds the
defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.

(3)
The enhanced penalties for offenses committed
under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 90
consecutive
days
in a jail
or other
secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 18 0
consecutive
days
in a jail
or
other
secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which
a life sentence is imposed, the convicted person
shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 2 0 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter
37,
37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding
drug-related
offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 3 ;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in
Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 3 ;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6,
Part
5,
except
Sections
76-6-503,
76-6-504,
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510,
76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516,
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520;
(2)
any
offense
of
obstructing
government
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8,
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except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304,
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation
of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter
10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section
76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction
Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in
Section 76-10-2002.
(5)
(a)
This section does not create any separate
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the
primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced
penalties under this section that the persons with
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are
not
identified,
apprehended,
charged,
or
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty
under this section. The imposition of the penalty
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing
judge
that
this
section
is
applicable.
In
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written
findings
of
fact
concerning
the
applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution
of the sentence required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be
best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying
the disposition on the record and in writing.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) provides:
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct
commission of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

The fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of las; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
4

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to
a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment -Grand jury.]
5

Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
Sec. 24.

[Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have

uniform operation.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
1.

Whether the State elicited sufficient evidence

with respect to the mens

rea

of Joshua Behunin to support

imposition of the gang enhancement?
Standard of review.

While ordinarily factual findings

are reviewed for clear error, here a correction of error standard
applies.

Judge Stirba, who was not present at trial, made her

findings based on the transcript of the trial.

See State v.

Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App. 1993) (findings and
conclusions premised on trial court review of interrogation
transcript are reviewed under correction of error standard).
Preserved below by Objection to Imposition of Gang
Enhancement [] Penalties and Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement
Statute, R. 690-700; 866.
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2.

Whether the gang enhancement of § 76-3-203.1

defines a separate offense subject to the panoply of protections
accorded criminal defendants?
Standard of review.

Questions of statutory and

constitutional construction are issues of law reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993),

State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991).
Preserved below by Objection to Imposition of Gang
Enhancement [] Penalties and Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement
Statute, R. 690-700.

3.

Whether the gang enhancement is unconstitutional

as violative of article I, sections 7 and 24, and the federal
equal protection clause because it fails to meet its legislative
purpose in a rational, narrowly drawn manner?
Standard of Review.

A trial court's conclusion that a

statute is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness.

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) .

Preserved below by Objection to Imposition of Gang
Enhancement [] Penalties and Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement
Statute, R. 690-700.

4.

Whether the gang enhancement is void for

vagueness?

7

Standard of review.

A trial court's conclusion that

a statute is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed
for correctness.

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).

Preserved below by Objection to Imposition of Gang
Enhancement [] Penalties and Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement
Statute, R. 690-700.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Troy Labrum and co-defendant David Mills were charged
in an amended information (R. 7-9) with attempted murder stemming
from a drive-by shooting at 2100 South and 700 East on September
20, 1992.

The information indicated the State's intention to

seek a firearm enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1995))1
and a "gang" enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995).

A

third defendant, Joshua Behunin was handled through the juvenile
system.
Jury trial was held February 16-18 before Senior Judge
Jay E. Banks.

See transcripts, R. 97-279 (2/16/93), 280-485

(2/17/93), and 486-627 (2/18/93).
were convicted.

Mr. Labrum and his codefendant

R. 49 (verdict), 615-6 (verdict read by clerk on

the record).
Mr. Labrum was sentenced by Judge Banks on March 22,
1993, to a term of 1 to 15 years, to run consecutively with the 6
year gang enhancement and 5 year firearm enhancement.

1

R. 80.

This enhancement was enlarged to a "dangerous weapon"
enhancement in 1995. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1996).
8

This Court affirmed the conviction, but clarified that Mr.
Labrum's sentence was a gang enhanced 6 to 15 year sentence with
a consecutive 1 to 5 year firearm enhancement.

State v. Labrum,

881 P.2d 900, 902 n.4 (Utah App. 1994), cert, granted, 892 P.2d
13 (Utah 1995).
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reversed and
held that it was plain error for the trial court not to enter
written findings concerning imposition of the gang enhancement as
required by § 76-3-203.1(5)(c).
(Utah 1996).

State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937

On remand, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba found the

gang enhancement to be constitutional.

R. 879-880.

Judge Stirba

further found that sufficient evidence supported the reimposition
of the gang enhancement, and that application of the enhancement
to Mr. Labrum was appropriate.

R. 878-9, 880; 839-42 (Court

Order for Gang Enhancement, attached as addendum A ) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following is all the evidence relevant to the back
seat passenger's mental state at the time of the shooting:
Wilmer Weffer, a back seat passenger of the victim
vehicle (R. 164), testified that the three occupants of the
shooter's vehicle stared at him.

R. 166.

He also testified that

the front seat passenger in the shooter's car flashed gang signs.
R. 167-8, 194.

While front seat passenger Danny Owen did not

actually see any gang signs, R. 215, 218, he overheard someone
say that they saw gang signs, R. 2 05.
9

Back seat passenger

Daniel Suluai thinks Wilmer may have seen gang signs, and that
Wilmer might have "flipped them off."

R. 247.

At the

intersection of 21st South and 7th East, the shooter's car pulled
to the right side of the victims' vehicle and the front seat
passenger fired a handgun over the roof of the car at the
victims' vehicle.

R. 169-70.

Danny Owen identified Joshua

Behunin as the backseat passenger of the vehicle from which Mr.
Labrum allegedly fired the shots.

R. 211.

Nineteen year old Kevin McCray testified as to
conversations he overheard both prior to and the day after the
shooting:
Q
Do you recall, was there a period of time in
the fall of last year where you were living with
[Troy], living together?
A
Yes, I was.
Q
Do you remember where you were living at the
time?
A
In West Valley on 2995 South. I'm not sure
what West.

Q

Who else

A

Joe Kelly, Josh

was living

at that

Behunin,

address?

and I'm not sure who

else.
Q
Was there any adult living at that address?
A
Just Joe Kelly?
Q
Joe Kelly?
A
Yes.
Q
Troy, how long had he been living at that
address?
A
A month.
Q
So he wasn't living at home with his parents
at the time?
A
No, he wasn't.
Q
Are you also familiar with David Mills?
A
Yes, I am.
Q
How long have you known him?
A
Approximately four or five months.
MR. JONES: Can we stipulate to
identification.
MR. Xaiz: We'll stipulate to the
identification.
THE COURT: He is identified by stipulation.
10

Q
Was he also living at that address?
A
No, he wasn't.
Q
He was living some place else?
A
I'm not sure where.
Q
Let me direct your attention then to the 20th
of September of '92 about 11 o'clock in the morning.
Do you remember being at that address at that time?
A
Yes, I do.
Q
And do you remember who else was present at
the address?
A
Joe Kelly was present, Troy Labrum was
present, David Mills and Josh Behunin.
Q
And yourself?
A
And myself.
Q
And do you remember at that time there
being
or overhearing
a conversation
between Mr. Mills and Mr.
Labrum?
A
Yes, I do.
Q
Do you remember what was said at that
time?
A
David Mills was asking Joe Kelly if he could
borrow the car for the day.
And Troy Labrum come in
and they were talking
about borrowing
the car.
And
they said they wanted to go shoot
somebody.
Q
Who made the comment about shooting someone?
A
Troy Labrum.
Q
Troy Labrum made the statement. Where was
Mr. Mills when the comment was made?
A
He was standing next to him.
Q
And who was it that had requested of Joseph
Kelly to borrow the car?
A
It was both David Mills and Troy Labrum.
Q
And they both asked to borrow the car?
A
Yes.
Q
How close were you when this conversation
was
taking
place?
A
No more than ten
feet.
Q
And you mentioned
that Joshua Behunin was
there,
too.
A
Yes, he was.
Q
Where was he at the time of the
conversation?
A
Standing somewhere in the kitchen.
He wasn't
in plain sight,
but I did see him.
Q
How far away would he have been.
A
Fifteen
or 20
feet.
Q
Was there anything else that you recall being
said at that time?
A
I believe that was it, just them asking for
the car and going to shoot somebody.
Q
Did you overhear anything about the details
of the shooting, why or how?
A
No, I didn't.
11

Q
Did there come a point
in time then when
people
left
the home?
A
Yes.
Q
When was that in relationship
to
this
conversation?
A
It was about an hour and a half
later.
Q
So you recall the statement being made about
11 o'clock?
A
Yes.
Q
And so then an hour and a half goes by until
they leave?
A
Yes.
Q
And do you recall
who
left?
A
Troy Labrum, David Mills
and Josh
Behunin.
these

Q
Did you see [Troy] again the next day? Now
we are talking about Monday, the 21st of September.
A
Yes, I did.
Q
Where would you have seen him on that day?
A
I seen Troy Labrum and Josh Behunin in my
bedroom. They were showing me a newspaper article
about the drive-by shooting they did the [d]ay before.
Q
What do you recall about the article?
A
It just says there was a shooting on 21st
South and 7th East. And that's mostly what I remember
about it.
Q
And was Mr. Mills there at the time?
A
No, he wasn't.
Q
So it was just Mr. Labrum and Mr. Behunin?
A
Yes.
Q
And what do you recall being said at that
time concerning the newspaper article?
A
Well, Troy was bragging about that they were
the ones that did it. These are the people we shot.
Q
Do you recall, were those his exact words?
A
He said, [M]This is what we did; this is the
shooting that we did.["]
Q
Those comments c[a]me from who?
A
They come from Troy Labrum.
Q
Then did anything else happen while you were
there?
A
Josh burnt the article on the top of a Pepsi
can, and that was the end of it.
Q
Josh Behunin?
A
Yes.
Q
Was there any further discussion about the
shooting?
A
No, there wasn't.
R. 285-288; 291-292 (emphasis added).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State failed to adduce sufficient evidence that a
third person acted in concert with Mr. Labrum and Mr. Mills.

There

is nothing to indicate that Mr. Behunin overhead Mr. Labrum and Mr.
Mills discussing plans to shoot someone. Even if he had overheard,
there is nothing indicating that Mr. Behunin solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in commission of the
offense.

The gang enhancement imposed against Mr. Labrum must be

vacated.
The gang enhancement is unconstitutional.

Section 76-3-

203.1 defines separate offenses with the added element of
concert" action with 2 or more others.
"proof

beyond

constitute

the

a

reasonable
crime

.

.

doubt
."

of
The

"in

In re Winship requires
every

complex

fact

necessary

intent

to

questions

underlying application of the gang enhancement are the type of
facts most susceptible to error, and should be determined by the
jury.

The Utah legislature has exceeded the permissible bounds of

offense definition by its attempt to characterize the "in concert"
action as a sentencing consideration, rather than an element of the
substantive offense.
Under a state due process analysis, this Court should
reject the federal test for whether a given fact is an element of
an offense. Mullanev and Patterson are irreconcilable.

The United

States Supreme Court has adopted an overly formalistic test that
fails to delineate between legitimate legislative adjustments and
intolerable abuses.

As a matter of state due process, any fact
13

comprising

part

of

the

prohibited

conduct

which

results

in

additional stigma and punishment is an element of the offense,
subject

to

defenses.

the

full

panoply

of protections

accorded

criminal

Because the gang enhancement does not provide for a jury

determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as a
preliminary hearing, the statute violates due process.
The gang enhancement violates the Uniform Operation of
Laws provision of article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
Legislative

history makes clear that the gang enhancement

drafted to target members of criminal street gangs.

was

The gang

enhancement does not have a reasonable tendency to further the
objectives of the statute -- it fails to differentiate between
actual gang members and nonmembers.

The relationship of this

classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable
fanciful.
to the

and

The legislature left proper application of the statute

discretion

of

sentencing

judges, who, unguided

by

any

statutory criteria, are misapplying the law to non-gangmembers.
The statute violates article I, section 24.
The gang enhancement violates state due process because
application of the statute is arbitrary and capricious.

While the

purpose of the statute is to curb criminal street gangs and their
criminal activities, the statute fails to address this concern in
a rational manner.

Non-gangmembers are swept up and made subject

to the enhancement, despite the fact that this does nothing to
further the goals of the legislation.
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Federal equal protection is violated by the statute.
Because the statute affects fundamental constitutional rights to a
preliminary hearing, trial by jury, and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, heightened scrutiny applies.

The enhancement statute fails

the strict scrutiny test, and is not narrowly tailored to effect
its purpose.
The gang enhancement statute is void for vagueness.

It

impinges on protected association rights, and fails to adequately
define the scope of its application.

The statute contains no

guidelines to constrain the discretion of the judiciary.

As a

result, the enhancement is being applied to non-gangmembers who
were

never

intended

by

the

legislature

to

receive

enhanced

sentences under the statute.
This Court should declare the gang enhancement statute
unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE
BACK SEAT PASSENGER POSSESSED A CRIMINAL MENS
REA TO SUPPORT APPLICATION OF THE GANG
ENHANCEMENT HERE.
Judge Stirba premised her findings supporting imposition
of the gang enhancement on her review of the trial transcript.2
839.

The gang enhancement, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1

R.

(1995),

provides for an increased minimum term when an offense is committed
"in concert with two or more persons," defined as meaning that "the
2

Senior Judge Jay E. Banks presided at trial and the initial
sentencing.
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defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.1 (1) (b) .

Section 76-2-202 provides:

Every person, acting with the mental state required for
the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
Fully marshalled, the facts having any bearing on Joshua Behunin's
mental

state

are

insufficient

to

establish

that

he

would

be

criminally liable under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202.
The trial court relied on a conversation between Mr.
Labrum and codefendant David Mills.

Finding 1, R. 83 9.

Nineteen

year old Kevin McCray testified as follows:
Q
Do you recall, was there a period of time in
the fall of last year where you were living with [Troy] ,
living together?
A
Yes, I was.
Q
Do you remember where you were living at the
time?
A
In West Valley on 2995 South.
I'm not sure
what West.

Q

Who else

A

Joe Kelly, Josh

was living

at that

Behunin,

address?

and I'm not sure who

else.
Q
A
Q
A
Q
address?
A
Q
the time?
A
Q
A
Q
A

Was there any adult living at that address?
Just Joe Kelly?
Joe Kelly?
Yes.
Troy, how long had he been living at that
A month.
So he wasn't living at home with his parents at
No, he wasn't.
Are you also familiar with David Mills?
Yes, I am.
How long have you known him?
Approximately four or five months.
MR. JONES: Can we stipulate to identification.
16

MR.
Xaiz:
We'll
stipulate
to
the
identification.
THE COURT: He is identified by stipulation.
Q
Was he also living at that address?
A
No, he wasn't.
Q
He was living some place else?
A
I'm not sure where.
Q
Let me direct your attention then to the 20th
of September of '92 about 11 o'clock in the morning. Do
you remember being at that address at that time?
A
Yes, I do.
Q
And do you remember who else was present at the
address?
A
Joe Kelly was present, Troy Labrum was present,
David Mills and Josh Behunin.
Q
And yourself?
A
And myself.
Q
And do you remember at that time there being or
overhearing
a conversation
between Mr. Mills
and Mr.
Labrum ?
A
Yes, I do.
Q
Do you remember what was said at that
time?
A
David Mills
was asking Joe Kelly if he could
borrow the car for the day.
And Troy Labrum come in and
they were talking
about borrowing the car.
And they
said
they wanted to go shoot
somebody.
Q
Who made the comment about shooting someone?
A
Troy Labrum.
Q
Troy Labrum made the statement. Where was Mr.
Mills when the comment was made?
A
He was standing next to him.
Q
And who was it that had requested of Joseph
Kelly to borrow the car?
A
It was both David Mills and Troy Labrum.
Q
And they both asked to borrow the car?
A
Yes.
Q
How close were you when this conversation
was
taking
place?
A
No more than ten
feet.
Q
And you mentioned
that
Joshua Behunin
was
there,
too.
A
Yes, he was.
Q
Where was he at the time of the
conversation?
A
Standing somewhere in the kitchen.
He wasn't
in plain sight,
but I did see him.
Q
How far away would he have been.
A
Fifteen
or 20
feet.
Q
Was there anything else that you recall being
said at that time?
A
I believe that was it, just them asking for the
car and going to shoot somebody.
17

Q
Did you overhear anything about the details of
the shooting, why or how?
A
No, I didn't.
Q
Did there come a point
in time then when
these
people
left
the home?
A
Yes.
Q
When was
that
in
relationship
to
this
conversation?
A
It was about an hour and a half
later.
Q
So you recall the statement being made about 11
o'clock?
A
Yes.
Q
And so then an hour and a half goes by until
they leave?
A
Yes.
Q
And do you recall
who
left?
A

Troy

Labrum,

David

Mills

and Josh

Behunin.

R. 285-288 (emphasis added).
This testimony fails to establish Mr. Behunin's mental
state.

While he was in the house at the time of the conversation

between Messrs. Labrum and Mills about shooting someone, he was 15
to 20 feet away, in the kitchen, and not "in plain sight."
was no testimony
conversation.

concerning

the loudness

or quietness

There
of

the

From the record, it is impossible to tell if Mr.

Behunin was physically capable of even hearing the conversation
from his distance of 15 to 20 feet away.

There is nothing to

indicate what Mr. Behunin was doing at the time, or that Mr.
Behunin in fact heard the conversation.
Finding 2 states that
as the back seat passenger.

Behunin left with Mills and Labrum
The fact that some one and a half

hours later Mr. Behunin left with Mr. Labrum and Mr. Mills says
nothing about his mental

state.

If he was unaware that they

intended to shoot someone, he cannot be said to be soliciting,
requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding them.
18

Even if he was aware of their plan, sitting passively in the
backseat does not constitute solicitation, encouragement, or aid in
any fashion.
Findings 3 through 5 are that the victims were followed
for several blocks prior to the shooting "flashed gang signs," and
stared at the victims (R. 168) . None of this conduct is criminal.
None

evidences

that Joshua Behunin was aware

that Mr. Labrum

intended to shoot anyone, or that he solicited, encouraged, or
aided that activity.
Finally, the trial court relied on a conversation the
following day.

Findings 8, 9.

Kevin McCray testified:

Q
Did you see [Troy] again the next day? Now we
are talking about Monday, the 21st of September.
A
Yes, I did.
Q
Where would you have seen him on that day?
A
I seen Troy Labrum and Josh Behunin in my
bedroom. They were showing me a newspaper article about
the drive-by shooting they did the [d]ay before.
Q
What do you recall about the article?
A
It just says there was a shooting on 21st South
and 7th East. And that's mostly what I remember about
it.
Q
And was Mr. Mills there at the time?
A
No, he wasn't.
Q
So it was just Mr. Labrum and Mr. Behunin?
A
Yes.
Q
And what do you recall being said at that time
concerning the newspaper article?
A
Well, Troy was bragging about that they were
the ones that did it. These are the people we shot.
Q
Do you recall, were those his exact words?
A
He said, ["]This is what we did; this is the
shooting that we did.["]
Q
Those comments c[a]me from who?
A
They come from Troy Labrum.
Q
Then did anything else happen while you were
there?
A
Josh burnt the article on the top of a Pepsi
can, and that was the end of it.
Q
Josh Behunin?
A
Yes.
19

Q
Was there any further discussion
shooting?
A

about

the

No, there wasn't.

R. 291-292 (emphasis added).
This evidence likewise says nothing about Mr. Behunin's
mental state the day before.

Mr. Behunin said nothing.

The "we"

Mr. Labrum refers to could be Mr. Labrum and Mr. Mills, rather than
Mr. Labrum and Mr. Behunin.
article

are

at

best

Mr. Behunin's actions in burning the

ambiguous,

and

are

more

consistent

feelings of disgust than participation and pride.

with

In total, there

is no convincing evidence that Joshua Behunin was aware of the plan
to shoot someone.

His actions in riding in the back seat are not

a solicitation, request, command, encouragement, or aid in the
commission of the offense.

Even if Mr. Behunin flashed gang signs

(and the evidence does not establish that he did) , this is neither
illegal nor a solicitation to commit attempted homicide.
While the evidence establishes that Mr. Labrum and Mr.
Mills participated in the shooting, it fails to establish that Mr.
Behunin

was

anything

other

than

a

passive

observer.

"Mere

presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one an accomplice
when he neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in
perpetration of the crime."
(Utah 1980)
accord

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166

(citing State v. Gee, 498 P.2d

State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d

presence
committed

combined with knowledge
or

a mental

347, 349

662

(Utah 1951)

that a crime

approbation

while

(Utah

is about

the will

1972));
("Mere
to be

contributes

nothing to the doing of the act, will not of itself constitute one
20

an accomplice.").

See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100

S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (A "person's mere propinquity
to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not,
without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person."),
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d
357

(1979)

(mere presence in a neighborhood frequented by drug

users does not give rise to reasonable suspicion);

United States

v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593, 68 S.Ct. 222, 228, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948)
("Presumptions of guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere
meetings.");
reasonable

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (no

suspicion where man walking near defendant

had run

away).
The State has proved nothing more than mere presence
here.

The factual predicate for imposition of the gang enhancement

was not established.

The gang enhancement should be vacated.

POINT II. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT DEFINES A SEPARATE
OFFENSE SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS ACCORDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the
sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantee defendants
the right to a jury trial.

A jury, rather than the trial court,

should make the factual findings concerning the applicability of
the gang enhancement.

Under article I, section 7 and the fifth and

fourteenth amendments, defendants have a due process right to be
presumed

innocent until the elements of an offense are proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Article I, section 13 guarantees the
21

right to a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause on all
elements of an offense prior to being bound over for trial.
The gang enhancement statute states that "[t]his section
does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced
penalty for the primary offense."

The legislature is elevating

form over substance -- in fact a new offense, with an additional
element, has been created.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501

(1995)

defines elements of criminal offenses as the conjunction of " [tjhe
conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed,
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense" and
11

[t]he culpable mental state required."

The conduct proscribed in

the gang enhancement satisfies both prongs of this element test.
"In concert" describes both the proscribed conduct and attendant
circumstances of the offense.

The mental state of the primary

offense likewise must be shown.3

The gang enhancement statute is

not an enhancement at all; it defines new offenses with the added
element of "in concert with two or more persons."

A.

THE LEGISLATURE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
"IN CONCERT" ELEMENT AS A SENTENCING
CONSIDERATION IMPERMISSIBLY DENIGRATES
THE INTERESTS FOUND CRITICAL IN WINSHIP,
AND VIOLATES FEDERAL DUE PROCESS.

3

The additional intent to commit the crime "in concert" must
also be shown.
Otherwise, defendants could be held criminally
responsible for conduct of others over whom the defendant has no
control.
For example, a person who slashes the tires of a car
should not receive a greater sentence for his or her criminal
mischief if two unrelated bystanders decide on the spur of the
moment that they want to break out the windows of the same car.
22

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068,
L.Ed.2d 368, 375

, 25

(1970) definitively held that "the Due Process

Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."

In Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.

684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) the court held it was
impermissible for the State of Maine to require a defendant to
prove by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion to
reduce his conviction from murder to manslaughter:
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute
a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine
many of the interests that decision sought to protect
without effecting any substantive change in its law. It
would only be necessary to redefine the elements that
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as
factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment.
Mullanev, 421 U.S. at 698.
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411,
91 L.Ed.2d

67

(1986),

the court upheld

a Pennsylvania

scheme

whereby a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence is imposed if the trial
judge finds by a preponderance that the defendant visibly possessed
a firearm during the commission of the offense.

The court noted

that there is little risk of error in the trial court making such
a determination.

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.

The court reiterated

that there are constitutional limits to a State's power to redefine
crimes in circumvention of Winship, but declined to specify the
precise confines of those limits.
court noted,

Id. at 86-7.

However, the

"[t]he statute gives no impression of having been
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tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense."

Id. at 88.

While the "tail wagging the dog" metaphor used by the
Supreme Court is admittedly imprecise, the sense of what is meant
is clear.

Sentencing considerations must involve additional facts

which are few in number, capable of easy determination, and not
subject to any appreciable risk of error in their determination.
The gang enhancement

statute exceeds the

permissible

limits of offense definition allowed by the due process clause, and
should be stricken as violative of the due process clause.

1.

Unlike
McMillan,

the

the

"in

The "in concert" finding involves
complicated evaluation of the mental
state of other actors, and is highly
susceptible to error.
"visible possession"

concert"

finding

here

finding

at

involves

issue

in

complicated

determinations of the intent of other individuals, who need not be
apprehended or even identified. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (b) .
Prior history in this case reveals the problems inherent in having
the sentencing

judge make the

"in concert" determination.

Labrum I, this Court observed:
[T]here is nothing in the record indicating whether the
trial court actually found that Joshua Behunin, the backseat passenger in the assailants' car, acted as an
accomplice in the shooting. Therefore, we are unable to
implicitly conclude that the trial court made the correct
factual findings and properly applied the governing rules
of law to those findings.
State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 905 (Utah App. 1994) .
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In

One of the motivating concerns in Winship was the need
for accurate fact determinations in criminal cases.
363.

397 U.S. at

The gang enhancement statute undermines this paramount goal

and invites perfunctory application of the enhancement without the
careful, considered fact-finding it properly warrants.
For action in concert, "the following three elements must
exist: (1) A concert of action; (2) a unity of purpose or design;
(3) two or more defendants working separately but to a common
purpose and each acting with the knowledge and consent of the
others."

Elliott v. Barnes, 645 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Wash. App. 1982).

Accord Gilbert H. Moen Company v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 878
P.2d 1246, 1249 (Wash. App. 1994) (in concert action requires that
the "actors consciously act together in an unlawful manner").
risk of erroneous
outside

the

fact-finding

realm

of

takes the

otherwise

"in concert"

permissible

The

element

sentencing

considerations, and mandates that the enhancement not be applied
absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

2.

The statute here is tailored such
that the "in concert" finding falls
outside the permissible limits of
offense definition set forth in
McMillan.

Proof of "in concert" activity requires proof that two
other actors committed a crime in conjunction with the primary
offense.
actor

The enhancement is only applicable if each additional

"commits

the

offense,

solicits,

requests,

commands,

encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage
25

in

conduct which constitutes an offense."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202

(1995), as applicable through § 76-3-203.1(1) (b) .
Of the three (or more) criminal actors, the State is only
required to prove to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one
is guilty.
that

the

The enhancement statute attempts to transform proof
other

function.

two

(or more)

are

culpable

into

a

sentencing

Two thirds of the required facts are relegated to the

sentencing court's perfunctory determination that the enhancement
is applicable.
the jury.4

Only one third of the necessary facts are proven to

The statute here falls outside the rule of McMillan,

and must be stricken.
bounds

of

offense

The State has exceeded the permissible
definition.

The

enhancement

statute

impermissibly relieves the State of its burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in violation of the federal due process clause.

B.

UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, "IN CONCERT"
ACTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AN ELEMENT
THAT MUST BE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT TO A JURY.

The Utah Supreme Court has not hesitated to depart from
federal standards when those standards become unworkable.5

Current

4

Expressed in terms of the metaphor used in McMillan, the tail
here (the finding that two others are criminally responsible) is
twice as large as the rest of the dog (the finding of criminal
responsibility of the primary actor), and wags the dog.
5

E.g. , State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991)
(rejecting some aspects of federal model for analyzing eyewitness
identifications); Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734
(Utah 1991) (recognizing due process rights in parole hearings);
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-8 (Utah 1991) (rejecting
federal doctrine that bank depositors have no expectation of
privacy in bank records); see also State v. Hygh, 711 P. 2d 264,
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federal law addressing offense definition and what constitutes an
element of a given offense has become unworkable and should be
rejected.

1.

Current federal standards governing
offense
definition
and
what
constitutes
an
element
are
unworkable.

In Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44
L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), the Supreme Court struck down a Maine statute
providing

that

malice

aforethought

would

be

presumed

and

an

intentional and unlawful homicide is murder unless the defendant
proved by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation.

The Court conducted an historical review of

murder and manslaughter and observed:
First, the fact at issue here -- the presence or absence
of heat of passion on sudden provocation -- has been,
almost from the inception of the common law of homicide,
the single most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide.
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving
this fact.
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696.

The court concluded that "By drawing

this distinction [between murder and manslaughter] , while refusing
to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests found

271-2 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring, noting federal law
had become a "labyrinth of rules built upon a series of
contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions," and
advocating separate state constitutional construction).
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critical in Winship. "

Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698.

A unanimous

court reversed.
In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53
L.Ed.2d 281

(1977), five members of the Court reached a result

directly contrary to that in Mullaney.

The New York statute at

issue required the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance to reduce a second
degree murder charge to manslaughter.
defense

as

"a considerably

The Court characterized the

expanded version of the

defense of heat of passion on sudden provocation . . . "

common-law
Patterson,

432 U.S. at 202. The Court further characterized the definition of
murder

at

issue

provocation.
The

in

Mullaney

as

including

the

absence

of

over

the

Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215-6.
dissent

took

the

majority

to

task

inconsistency with Mullaney:
The Court manages to run a constitutional boundary line
through the barely visible space that separates Maine's
law from New York's.
It does so on the basis of
distinctions in language that are formalistic rather than
substantive.
. . . Winship was violated [in Mullaney] only
because this fact -- malice -- was "presumed" unless the
defendant persuaded the jury otherwise by showing that he
acted in the heat of passion."
New York, in form
presuming no affirmative fact against Patterson,[] and
blessed with a statute drafted in the leaner language of
the 20th century, escapes constitutional
scrutiny
unscathed even though the effect on the defendant of New
York's placement of the burden of persuasion is exactly
the same as Maine's. . . .
With all respect, this type of constitutional
adjudication is indefensibly formalistic. A limited but
significant check on possible abuses in the criminal law
now becomes an exercise in arid formalities.
What
Winship and Mullaney had sought to teach about the limits
a free society places on its procedures to safeguard the
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liberty of its citizens becomes a rather simplistic
lesson in statutory draftsmanship.
. . . This decision simply leaves us without
a conceptual framework for distinguishing abuses from
legitimate legislative adjustments of the burden of
persuasion in criminal cases. []
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 221-5
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
and

Patterson

decisions

(Powell, J., joined by Brennan and

The practical results of the Mullaney
cannot

be

reconciled.

Fundamental

constitutional protections are now relegated under federal due
process to the vagaries of draftsmanship in the state legislatures.
The federal test should be rejected.

2.

This Court should define crime
elements as any fact comprising part
of the prohibited conduct which
results in additional stigma and
punishment.

In dissent from McMillan, Justice Stevens sets forth a
practical and workable test:
Once a State defines a
Due Process Clause requires it to
the prohibited transaction that
special stigma and a special
reasonable doubt.

criminal offense, the
prove any component of
gives rise to both a
punishment beyond a

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J. dissenting6).

Under article

I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, this Court should follow
this straightforward test.

The conduct of the other actors should

be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the gang enhancement is
applicable.

6

Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, dissenting, join in
this aspect of Justice Stevens' dissent. 477 U.S. at 94.
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Oregon has followed this approach.
652 P.2d

773

In State v. Wedge,

(Or. 1982), the Oregon Supreme Court stated that

"facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which
characterize the defendant are for the sentencing judge."
at 777.

Wedge involved a sentencing enhancement

firearm in the commission of an offense.

652 P. 2d

for use of a

The Oregon court found:

Although the challenged statute is denominated
an enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new
crime. The jury only considered evidence offered on the
question of first degree robbery, and convicted him of
that offense, but the defendant was sentenced on the
basis of having been found guilty of the crime of "first
degree robbery using a firearm." If the legislature had
actually described the crime as "first degree robbery
using a firearm" the use of the firearm would certainly
be an element and there would be no doubt defendant would
have a right to a jury determination of guilt.
The
legislature cannot eliminate constitutional protections
by separating and relabeling elements of a crime.
Wedge, 652 P.2d at 778.
Arizona likewise has drawn distinctions based on whether
the

enhancing

factor

under

consideration

involves

elements of culpability or merely concerns a status.

additional
In State v.

Hurley, 741 P.2d 257, 263 (Ariz. 1987) the Arizona court rejected
the contention that an enhancement based on release status required
a jury determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Parole

status has traditionally been a factor considered in sentencing,
has never been an element of a crime in Arizona, and involved no
determination of the conduct or mental state of the defendant.
Proof

involves

objective

evidence

with

little

risk

of

error.

However, in State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1987), the court
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found that the same enhancement based on escape status required a
jury determination:
Thus, unlike the release status considered in
Hurley, escape is a crime in itself. The crime of escape
contains its own elements: the state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the
requisite intent to escape.
In this case, Powers is
receiving additional punishment based on alleged criminal
conduct -- escape -- for which no jury has found him
guilty.
Powers, 742 P.2d at 795.
Powers

highlights

the

differences

between

the

Utah

statute and the California statute on which it was based.

The

California statute creates a new substantive crime of "a felony
committed

for

the

benefit

of,

at

the

direction

association with any criminal street gang."
186.22(b)(1).

of,

or

in

Cal. Penal Code §

Utah avoided the statutory definition of a new

offense, but the practical effect is the same:

the Utah statute

defines new offenses.
Requiring

a

jury

determination

of

the

"in

concert"

element would bring this area of law into accord with similar
provisions in Utah.

Utah law provides for a jury determination by

proof beyond a reasonable doubt

for both the dangerous weapon

enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995)) and under the
habitual criminal statutes

(Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 et seq.

(1995)) . Under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (providing for enhanced
penalties for drug offenses within 1000 feet of schools, churches,
parks, and the like), that the activity occurred within 1000 feet
is an element of the crime that must be found by the jury.

State

v. Powasnik, 918 P. 2d 146 (Utah App. 1996) (" [T] oday we explicitly
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announce the penalty enhancement statute adds an extra element to
those drug offenses that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
to the same trier of fact who decides the predicate offense.") . In
capital cases, aggravating circumstances must be proved to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546, 577-80,

585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, Durham, and Zimmerman, JJ., in
separate

opinions,

circumstances

are

collectively

elements

of

the

holding
crime

unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt).
serves identical purposes;
Additionally,

defendants

hearing addressing

the

that

which

aggravating

the

jury

must

The gang enhancement

the same protections should apply.

should

be

entitled

to

a

preliminary

"in concert" activity under article

I,

section 13 of the Utah Constitution.
This Court should follow the element test set forth in
Justice Steven's dissent in Patterson:
the prohibited
punishment

any fact comprising part of

conduct which results in additional

is an element

of the offense.7

This

stigma

accords

and
with

practice in Oregon under Wedge and Arizona under Powers.
Under this test, the gang enhancement is unconstitutional
as it violates article I, sections 7, 12, and 13 of the Utah

7

Utah
provides:

Code

Ann.

§ 76-1-501 (2) (a)

requires

no

less.

It

(2) As used in this part the words "element of the
offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or
forbidden in the definition of the offense;
The gang enhancement proscribes specified conduct and attendant
circumstances; "in concert" activity is thus an element.
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Constitution.

Fundamental to Utah's criminal jurisprudence is the

proposition that a person is presumed innocent "until each element
of the offense" charged against him is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) (emphasis added); accord

State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981); State v. Torres, 619
P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 n.5
(Utah 1980); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 468-69
1988).

(Utah App.

By failing to require proof beyond a reasonable, the gang

enhancement violates article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Article I, section 12, as well as the sixth amendment,8
guarantees the right to jury trial.

It is well established that

the jury is provided with the sole ability to judge the facts in
criminal matters and to weigh the evidence.
judge from invading that province.

The law prohibits the

State v. Green, 6 P. 2d 177, 181

(Utah 1931); State v. Diaz, 290 P. 727, 731 (Utah 1930); State v.
Bruno, 256 P. 109, 110 (Utah 1927); State v. Greene, 94 P. 987, 989
(Utah 1908); State v. James, 89 P. 460, 463 (Utah 1907); People v.
Biddlecome, 2 P. 194 (Utah 1882).

The gang enhancement violates

article I, section 12 by providing that the trial court, rather
than a jury, is to determine whether the crime was committed in
concert with two or more others.
Article I, section 13 guarantees defendants a preliminary
hearing

on

designating

all

offenses.

itself

an

The

gang

enhancement

8

enhancement

rather

than

a

statute,

by

substantive

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d
491 (1968) (states may not abridge federal right to trial by jury
in criminal matters).
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offense, deprives defendants of preliminary hearings on the issue
of whether there is probable cause that the crime was committed in
concert

with

two

or more

others.

The

accused's

preliminary hearing is a substantial one.

right

State v. Pay,

to a
146 P.

3 00 (Utah 1915). The Supreme Court has ruled that unless a criminal
defendant

is

subjected

to

a

preliminary

examination

for

the

violation of a criminal statute, the prosecution is not authorized
to continue with a proceeding relating to the violation. State v.
Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 (Utah 1943) ; State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d
196, 199 (Utah 1937); State v. Nelson, 176 P. 860, 861 (Utah 1918).
The gang enhancement violates article I, section 13 by eliminating
this fundamental right to a preliminary hearing.
The

legislature's

declaration

in

§

76-3-203.1 (5) (a)

notwithstanding, the gang enhancement creates a separate offense by
proscribing conduct and attendant circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. §

76-1-501(2) . The constitutional protections applicable to elements
of

criminal

requirement

offenses,
of

proof

including
beyond

a

the presumption
reasonable

doubt,

of

innocence,

right

to

an

impartial jury, and right to a preliminary hearing, must be applied
to the "in concert" element of the gang enhancement.

The gang

enhancement statute is unconstitutional.

POINT III. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT VIOLATES STATE DUE
PROCESS, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS, AND
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT FAILS TO
MEET ITS LEGISLATIVE GOALS IN A REASONABLE
MANNER.
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Under

article

I,

sections

7

and

24

of

the

Utah

Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution, the gang enhancement is unconstitutional.

A,

UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 THE STATUTE
FAILS TO HAVE A REASONABLE TENDENCY TO
FURTHER
ITS
OBJECTIVES,
AND
THE
CLASSIFICATION
IS
UNREASONABLE
AND
FANCIFUL.

The gang enhancement fails the uniform operation of laws
test:
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to all
persons within a class.
[cites omitted]
Second, the

statutory
classifications
and the different
treatment
given the classes must be based on differences
that have
a reasonable tendency to further the objectives
of the
statute.

[cites omitted]

classification
unreasonable
unreasonable*

or

to

the
fanciful,

If

the

relationship

statutory
objectives
the
discrimination

of

the

is
is

[cite omitted]

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984) (declaring Utah
guest statute unconstitutional because the classification does not
have

a

statute)

reasonable

tendency

to

further

the

objectives

of

the

(emphasis added); accord Greenwood v. City of N. Salt

lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. Salt
Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988); see also McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191, 85 S.Ct. 283,
(1964)

("Judicial

inquiry

under

the

, 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 228

Equal

Protection

Clause,

therefore, does not end with a showing of equal application among
the members of the class defined by the legislation.

The courts

must reach and determine the question whether the classifications
drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose . . .") .
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State uniform operation analysis is more rigorous than
and

will

standard.

always

meet

or

exceed

the

federal

State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 467

denied, 857 P.2d 948

"rational

basis"

(Utah App.), cert,

(Utah 1993); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt

Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988); Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989).
The gang enhancement statute does not have a reasonable
tendency to further its legislative objectives.

Given the purpose

of the legislation, the classifications drawn in the statute are
unreasonable.

The gang enhancement is unconstitutional.

1.

The
legislative

gang

Legislative history indicates that
the gang enhancement was enacted to
target members of criminal street
gangs.

enhancement

statute

objectives on its face.

does

not

The legislative

list

history,

attached as addendum B, however, is abundantly clear:
[Bill sponsor Rep. Rushton:] Senate Bill 52 is what's
ended up after a lot of research this summer on the
street gang problems . . .
Id. at 1.
[P]olice departments estimate that in the Salt Lake
valley now there are six hundred plus members . . . of
these California style street gangs.
Of that six
hundred, it is estimated that a hardened criminal core of
the gangs, . . . it is estimated about three percent of
this group are hardened criminals with associations with
the street gangs in Los Angeles.
. . . Ah, Senator
Fordham and myself bee[a]me alarmed about this in about
July of last year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County
Attorney's Office on what was being done to prevent
street gangs in there, they told us about a piece of
36

its

legislation in California called "The Street Terrorism
Prevention Act." We brought a copy of that act to Utah,
But since that time, that act has run into
constitutional problems in California, so
the
Statewide Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in
conjunction with the Chief Police Association, came up
with this bill, the group criminal activities penalty,
which they feel confident avoids the constitutional
problems of the California Street Terrorism Act and will
be a useful tool.
It doesn't have the political or
psychological effects that our original Street Terrorism
[Act] had, because we used the term gang, we used the
term street terrorism in our bill, and they told us this
was the reason why it would become constitutionally
unsound.
at 2.
It is, looks benign, "Group Criminal Activities Penalty,"
but this is in fact what the Statewide [Association] of
Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want for tools
to be used against street gang prolif [er] ation in the
state of Utah.
. . . [T] he idea behind the enhanced
penalties in California and the idea here was to get that
center core, that's the core group of hardened criminals
that supplies the money, supplies the impetus for a true
criminal street gang. . . . Ah, it gets to the hardened
core, and the social workers tell us that the only thing
to do with them to allow social workers to work with the
remainder of the young people at risk in these gangs is
to get that hardened core off the streets. The enhanced
penalty is designed for that purpose.
. . . But this
enhanced penalty, we have got to get that hard core of
the street gang groups off of the streets, out of the
street gangs.
at 3.
This bill is directed at that core criminal element, that
three percent of those six hundred gang members that have
been identified that provide the father figure in these
gangs. And they provide also the connection [with] the
California gangs, the connection to the crack cocaine,
the money that is fueling this explosion of gang activity
in our cities and I'd like to ask you for your support
for this bill and thank you for your time.
at 7.

Debate in the Senate similarly indicates that the bill

designed to target criminal street gangs.
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Legislative History

2.

In

the

house

The
gang
enhancement
fails
to
effectively address the criminal
street gang problem, and is widely
applied to non-gangmembers.
debate,

Representative

Prante

asked

a

question concerning the impact of the legislation on three persons
acting in concert who were not actual gang members. He was assured
that that potential situation was covered by the definition in §762-2029 and by judicial discretion to not impose the enhancement.
Legislative
situation

History
that

at

6.

concerned

This

case

presents

Representative

precisely

Prante.

The

the

State

presented no evidence indicating that Mr. Labrum is a member of a
criminal street gang.

While § 76-3-203.1(6) provides judicial

discretion to suspend imposition of the gang enhancement, it fails
to

indicate

that non-membership

in a criminal

appropriate grounds for such suspension.
enhancement
criminal

street

gang

is

Simply stated, the gang

is routinely being applied to persons who are not

street gang members, contrary to the purposes of the

statute.
The

California

"Street

Terrorism

Enforcement

and

Prevention Act," enacted in 1988, is found in Cal. Penal Code §
186.20 et seq. (Supp. 1996), attached as addendum C.

Despite the

concerns

statute

expressed

by Rep. Rushton,

thus

far the

has

withstood constitutional challenge. People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App.
3d 957, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1991); In re Alberto R. , 235 Cal. App.
3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (1991).
9

Section 76-2-202 obviously does not address the issue of gang
membership in any fashion.
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Unlike the California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act," the gang enhancement statute fails to meet its
goals in a rational manner. Representative Rushton made clear that
the act was intended to target criminal street gangs in Utah.
Instead of being applied only to these individuals, the enhancement
has been and continues to be widely applied to a multitude of
individuals who do not belong to criminal street gangs.
Rather

than

designating

the

proper

targets

of

the

enhancement in the statute, the legislature attempted to rely on
judicial discretion to ensure that non-gangmembers would not be
sentenced under the enhancement.

Because the statute fails to

delineate the proper scope of its application, judges have been
unable to carry into effect the intent of the legislature.

The

statute fails to further the goals of the legislature in combatting
the influx and proliferation of criminal street gangs in Utah.
The

gang

enhancement,

while

intended

to

target

the

hardened core criminal element of criminal street gangs, sets apart
a statutorily defined class of individuals who commit crimes in
concert with 2 or more others.
than the targeted group.

This group is immensely broader

The statutory classification here is not

based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the
objectives

of

the

statute.

Since

the

relationship

of

the

classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable

and

fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable.

Malan v. Lewis, 693

P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt lake,
817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
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191,

85 S.Ct. 283,

, 13 L.Ed.2d

222, 228

(1964).

The gang

enhancement should be stricken as unconstitutional.

B.

APPLICATION OF THE GANG ENHANCEMENT TO
NON-GANGMEMBERS
IS
ARBITRARY
AND
CAPRICIOUS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.

In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266

(Utah 1988), the

Supreme Court struck Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-21.5(4) (c) and -(d) as
violative of the due process clause:
We believe that subsections (c) and (d) of section 77-3521.5(4) are not rationally related to the sentencing
process as opposed to civil commitment.
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271.
of parens

patriae

-- placement in the hospital for the patient's

own best interest.
doctrine

is

defendant's

Subsection (c) embodied the doctrine

In the guilty and mentally ill context, this

inapplicable.
liberty

interest

The

question

will

be

is

not

curtailed,

whether
but

the

where.

Subsection (d) concerned least restrictive alternatives, again not
at issue where the defendant is to be incarcerated.
Not one of the considerations in subsections (c) and (d)
is relevant to the treatment rationale. The application
of those provisions to a mentally ill criminal defendant
is thus arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the due
process guarantee of article I, section VII of the Utah
Constitution. We therefore strike subsections (c) and
(d) of section 77-35-21.5(4) as unconstitutional.
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1272.
The "in concert" provisions of the gang enhancement are
likewise not rationally related to the statutory purpose of curbing
criminal street gang activity.

Gang members may act individually

or in concert, as may non-gangmembers.
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While the legislature had

a well defined group in mind when it enacted the statute, the
statute fails to target that group exclusively.

Persons who are

not gangmembers are swept up in this overbroad attempt to curb
criminal street gangs.

The gang enhancement should be struck as

unconstitutional in violation of article I, section 7 of the Utah
constitution.

C.

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT STATUTE
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION.

Under the federal

VIOLATES

scheme, if the statute deals with

sensitive constitutional values or discriminates based on suspect
classifications, the court will apply a heightened scrutiny of
legislative

means

and

ends,

involving

a

real

and

thoughtful

examination of legislative purpose and the relationship between the
legislation and that purpose. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P. 2d 572, 582
(Utah 1993); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989) (strict
scrutiny test is used if a challenged classification is "suspect"
or

if

a

"fundamental

interest"

is

involved);

Condemarin

University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 356, 358 (Utah 1989).

v.

I

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 affects fundamental rights
embodied in the state and federal constitutions, including the
right

to

jury

trial,

presumption

of

innocence,

right

to

a

preliminary hearing, and right to due process. Therefore, a strict
scrutiny standard applies.
"classifications

which

rights]

closely

must

be

Under the strict scrutiny standard,

might

invade

scrutinized
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or
and

restrain
carefully

[fundamental
confined."

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86
S.Ct. 1079,
The
While

, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 174 (1966).
gang

combatting

enhancement

criminal

fails

street

federal

gangs

is

a

strict

scrutiny.

legitimate

state

interest, the statute is not narrowly drawn towards that purpose.
Rather than applying strictly, or even primarily, to gangmembers,
the statute applies to non-gangmembers.
proper,

the

means

utilized

are

Even if the scope is

impermissible.

There

persuasive, much less rational, reason why application

is

no

of the

enhancement should not be determined by a jury by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The gang enhancement violates federal equal

protection, and should be stricken.

POINT

IV.
THE
VAGUENESS.

GANG

ENHANCEMENT

IS

VOID

FOR

Section 76-3-203.1 is void for vagueness under a federal
due process analysis. Basic principles of due process prohibit the
enactment of a statute if it is vague on its face.
Vague laws offend several important values.
First,
because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly.
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning.[]
Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. n
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application.[1 Third, but
related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,"11 it "operates
to
inhibit
the
exercise
of
[those]
f reedoms. "[]
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "'steer
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far wider of the unlawful zone'
. . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. "[]
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09,
, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28

(1972)

92 S.Ct.

2294,

(footnotes omitted); see also

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855,

, 75

L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817
P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991).

A.

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT STATUTE FAILS TO
ADEQUATELY DEFINE WHAT IS MEANT BY "IN
CONCERT" CONDUCT.

Section 76-3-203.1(1)(b) provides that "'In concert with
two or more persons' as used

in this

section means

that

the

defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202."
clear what the defendant's mental state must be.

It is far from

Section 76-2-202

provides:
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
While on its face this section does not seem to require that the
defendant have any intent

to engage in the conduct in concert with

others, as a matter of due process the State should not subject an
individual

to harsher punishment

others.

Some

element

of

based

intent,

on the random

knowledge,

or

acts of
at

least

acquiescence in the aid of others must be required, although the
statute fails to make this clear.
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The statute likewise does not specify the nature of its
true intent. The statute was enacted to combat the criminal street
gang problem in Utah, yet fails to recognize, identify, or define
the problem at all.
(outlining

Compare Cal. Penal Code

legislative

goals

(§186.21),

§186.20 et seq.

defining

"pattern

of

criminal gang activity" (§186.22 (e), and defining "criminal street
gang"

(§186.22 (f))) .

California

courts

statute

have

in

relied

rejecting

on

the

specificity

of

challenges.

In re Alberto R. , 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr.

2d 348

the

California

vagueness

(1991); People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App. 3d 957, 286 Cal.

Rptr. 894 (1991).

The language of the statute here is vague, and

fails to convey the statute's true intent.

B.

THE
GANG
ENHANCEMENT
CONTAINS
NO
GUIDELINES CONCERNING APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTE.

The Supreme Court has explained that the most critical
aspect

of

legislatures

the

vagueness

provide

doctrine

sufficient

is

the

requirement

guidelines

concerning

application of a penal statute:
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to
citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized
recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness
doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal
element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." Smith [v. Goguen] , 415 U.S. [566,] 574, 94
S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 [(1974)].
Where the
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a
criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that]
allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections." Id., at 575.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (footnote omitted).
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that
the

The primary failing of the gang enhancement statute is
its

complete

application.

failure
Section

to

set

guidelines

76-3-203.1

concerning

impermissibly

its

proper

delegates basic

policy matters to judges for resolution on an ad hoc basis, as
reflected in the legislative history and the text of the statute.
Judges

are

expected

to

use

their

discretion

in

determining whether Section 76-3-203.1 applies, as reflected in
Rep. Rushton's statements in the legislative history:
[T] he sentencing judge, rather than the jury, shall
decide whether to impose the penalty. We are not going
to make any effort to take the judicial discretion out of
this penalty phase. It will give the judge the right, if
he feels that an individual needs to be taken out of that
situation for this enhanced period of time, the judge
still has the discretion to either take him out for an
enhanced period of time or . . . not.
Legislative history at 3.

In response to questions concerning the

broad language of the statute, and whether persons who are not
gangmembers could be convicted under the statute of "essentially
gang activities", Rep. Rushton assured legislators that

judges

could be trusted to apply the statute in only the limited, gangrelated circumstances intended.

Id.

While the statute does in fact grant judges discretion to
suspend application of the enhancement, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1(6), it utterly fails to constrain or guide that discretion in
any fashion.

The legislature intended and expected that judges

would refuse to apply the gang enhancement to defendants who were
not actual gangmembers.

Contrary to that intent, the enhancement

has routinely been applied to individuals who are not gangmembers.
Justice Howe has described the hazards of such a statute:
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It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could
set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders,
and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large.
This would, to some extent, substitute the
judicial
for
the
legislative
department
of
the
government.
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d

1321, 1324

(Utah 1986)

(Howe,

J.,

concurring) (quoting U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563
(1875)) . Section 76-3-203.1 casts a large net sweeps too broadly,
without appropriate guidelines for the judges who are called upon
to impose the enhancement.

The gang enhancement statute should be

declared void for vagueness.

C.
The

final

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT CHILLS THE EXERCISE
OF SENSITIVE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS.
consideration

under

Gravned

is

whether

the

challenged statute inhibits the exercise of basic first amendment
freedoms.

While criminal conduct in association with others is not

protected by the First Amendment, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 516-17, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951), mere association
with others is. NAACP. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d
beyond

debate

that

freedom

to

1488, 1498

engage

in

(1958)

association

("It
for

is
the

advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.").
As

a

result

of

the

lack

of

guidelines

constraining

judicial discretion in application of the enhancement, individuals
are left uncertain whether the enhancement might be applied to
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them.

Although the State is required to prove the mental state of

the alleged aiders and abettors, to date this requirement has been
sporadically applied at best.

Against this backdrop, exercise of

the right to association is being chilled.

The statute causes

citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if
the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked" and to
avoid

the association of other persons

uncertainty

of

the

enforcement

of

the

in order to avoid
statute.

The

the
gang

enhancement should be stricken as being unconstitutionally vague.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Labrum respectfully requests
that the gang enhancement imposed against him be vacated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

6

day of August, 1997.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

KRISTINE M. ROGERS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber
M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this

0

day of August, 1997.

Robert K. Heineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of August, 1997.
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ADDENDUM A
Court Order for Gang Enhancement, R. 83 9-42

ThirH ln^i^i-si Histr:

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736
—
Deputy District Attorney
j jji \T^ - % ? ? ^ J
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
I^jit H^-l^
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

COURT ORDER FOR GANG
ENHANCEMENT
(76-3-203.1 UCA)

Plaintiff,
-vsTROY LABRUM,
Defendant.

CaseNo.921901791FS
Hon. Anne M. Stirba

Based on a review of the trial transcript and the arguments of counsel the Court enters the
following findings:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 20,1992 at 11:00 a.m., Kevin McCray overheard a conversation

between David Mills and Troy Labrum in which they discussed wanting to shoot someone, (p.
186) They also discussed borrowing Joe Kelly's car, a Mercury Topaz. Joshua Behunin was in
the house, approximately 15-20 feet away, when this conversation took place about shooting
someone.
2.

David Mills, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behunin left together in the Mercury

Topaz, (p. 187) David Mills drove the car. Troy Labrum sat in thefrontpassenger seat and
Joshua Behunin sat in the back seat wearing a baseball cap. (p. 188-89)
3.

David Mills, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behumin pursued or followed the victims

in a car for several blocks before shots were fired, (p. 69)

000>
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PROPOSED ORDER FOR GANG ENHANCEMENT
Case No. 96
Page 2

4.

David Mills, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behunin "flashed gang signs" or signals at

the victims during the pursuit, (p. 71)
5.

David Mills, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behunin were "staring" at the victims, (p.

6.

David Mills was identified as the driver of the car used in the drive-by shooting.

70)

(p. 76,113,144)
7.

Troy Labrum was identified as the person who fired five (5) shots at the victims,

(p. 77,112)
8.

The next day, September 21,1992, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behunin showed

Kevin McCray a newspaper article concerning a drive-by shooting on 2100 South and 700 East,
(pg. 191) Troy Labrum bragged to Kevin McCray that "we did the shooting." (p. 191)
9.

Joshua Behunin burned the newspaper article about the shooting after the

conversation was finished, (p. 191)
10.

Troy Labrum and David Mills were convicted of Attempted Homicide by a jury in

Third District Court on February 16,1993.
11.

Joshua Behunin, a juvenile, was also arrested and charged in Juvenile Court with

Attempted Homicide. Joshua Behunin was certified to stand trial as an adult. Joshua Behunin
was bound over in a preliminary hearing to stand trial by Judge Dennis Fuchs on January 21,
1993. Charges were dismissed without prejudice on April 20,1994 when the State was unable to
locate the eye witnesses.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The gang enhancement statute pursuant to 76-3-203 is appropriate. The shooting

of September 20, 1992 took place in concert with two or more persons.

'J 0 i» > 4

PROPOSED ORDER FOR GANG ENHANCEMENT
Case No. 96
Page 3

2.

Troy Labrum is sentenced to an additional six (6) years in prison under the gang

enhancement statute.
3.

The gang enhancement statute pursuant to §76-3-203 is constitutional.

DATED this P - B ^ a y of January, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

ANNE M. STIRBA, Judge *
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PROPOSED ORDER FOR GANG ENHANCEMENT
Case No. 96
Page 4

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Order For Gang
Enhancement was delivered to Kristine Rogers, Attorney for Defendant Troy Labrum, at 424
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the \4ri day of January, 1997.
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OEUVERED BY
JA:j 2 t 1997
P. ESPiNOZA

'J u • } ' : 4 ;•

ADDENDUM B
Gang Enhancement legislative history

LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SENATE BILL 52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
76-3-203.1/ THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THREE
OR MORE PERSONS.
Legislative History:
Senate Bill 52, currently found in Utah Code Ann. section
76-3-203*1/ and referred to in L* 1990/ ch. 207 section 1# was
passed on February 21, 1990, approved on March 12, 1990/ and became
effective on April 23/ 1990.
The Office of Legislative Counsel to the Utah Legislature
has no committee reports concerning this legislation. The only
evidence of legislative intent to be found outside the statute
itself is the taped and transcribed floor debates in the house and
the senate. Tapes are available at the respective offices in the
Utah State Capitol.

House Floor debates on Senate Bill 52
February 21 f 1990
Speaker of the House:
Who's the sponsor of Senate Bill 52?
Rushton.

Representative

Representative Rushton:
Ah, this is kind of a surprise that it come up so fast this
morning, ah, Senate Bill 52 is what's ended up after a lot
of research this summer on the street gang problems, mostly
in the Salt Lake County, some in Davis and Otah County.
Ah, I'm sure most counties that have any town size at all
will have ... be affected by the street gangs that are
coming into Otah. There's several reasons why there's such
a giant influx of criminal street gangs in atah. The main
reason is the price differential of crack cocaine. Ah, in
Los Angeles, crack cocaine is in a surplus or a buyer's
market. It can be bought between three and four hundred
dollars an ounce. That same crack cocaine will sell in
Salt Lake for somewhere around twenty four hundred dollars
an ounce in some rural cities in Otah we'll get as much as
three hundred ...er three thousand dollars an ounce. This
price differential has brought about a phenomenon with the
Los Angeles street gangs that's called franchising. The
reason it's called franchising, it isn't a whole lot
different than McDonald's. They franchise out. We've
always had local street gangs in Utah. They've been
involved in petty crime, a social service nuisance, anyone
who lives in this metropolitan area is familiar with them,
the graffiti, ah, when I was a boy thirty five years ago,

there were street gangs in Salt Lake City. Ah, but they
they weren't the serious problem that they are becoming now!
with the introduction of crack cocaine. Ah, police
departments estimate that In the Salt Lake valley now there
are six hundred plus members, identifiable members of these
California style street gangs, of that six hundred, it is
estimated that a hardened criminal core of the gangs,
generally young adults — the gangs consist of youths all
the way from nine, and I call them youths, nine to twenty
five, thirty years old. The young adults that belong to
this gang are, these gangs, it is estimated about three
percent of this group are hardened criminals with
associations with the street gangs in Los Angeles. When I
became aware of the existence of Los Angeles type gangs in
existence in my own neighborhood in Magna, and West Valley,
I become quite alarmed. Itfs a scary thought when we know
what happened to the Bronx in New York in the sixties
because of street gangs. Three hundred and seventy
something acres of the Bronx had to be literally given up
from the law enforcement and levelled. One of the most
vivid pictures of the street gang history in New York City,
er, the Bronx in New York was three hundred and seventy
acres of what was once communities, towns, neighborhoods,
as they call them in New lork, and those buildings were
bulldozed down, every last one of them, because of the
situation that arose out of the Bronx street gangs in the
fifties and sixties. Right now there are large areas of
Los Angeles where law enforcement has given up. They have
been bulldozed down. I don't think that situation will
ever come to Salt Lake or to Ogden, Clearfield, where the
street gangs are trenched right now, but elements of that
environment have came to Salt Lake. Ah, Senator Fordham
and myself become alarmed about this in about July of last
year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County Attorney's
Office on what was being done to prevent street gangs in
there, they told us about a piece of legislation in
California called "The Street Terrorism Prevention Act."
We brought a copy of that act to Otah, we got a lot of
literature about it, and we had a bill written up that
patterned the Street Terrorism Act* But since that time,
that act has run into constitutional problems in
California, so we had representatives from SWAP, do a lot
of research on it, and they came up, the Statewide
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in conjunction with
the Chief Police Association, came up with this bill, the
group criminal activities penalty, which they feel
confident avoids the constitutional problems of the
California Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool.
It doesnft have the political or the psychological effects
that our original Street Terrorism bad, because we used the
term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our bill,
and they told us this was the reason why it would become
constitutionally unsound. So, if Y°o "«<* the bill it will
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not have the word "street gang" in it, in order to make it
so we're not, the constitutional problem comes with
labelling people by name. It is, looks benign, "Group
Criminal Activities Penalty," but this is in fact what the
Statewide of Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want
for tools to be used against street gang prolification
[sic] in the state of Utah. Ah, I can go through the act,
ah, but the main parts of the act at first is it provides
an enhanced penalty for group criminal activities, and that
is supplied on line twenty four of first page, "if crimes
are committed in concert of two or more persons" used in
this second, the second page describes the enhanced
penalties, ah, the idea behind the enhanced penalties in
California and the idea here was to get that center core,
that's the core group of hardened criminals that supplies
the money, supplies the impetus for a true criminal street
gang. We've got to differentiate that between a street
gang and a criminal street gang - it's a different world
altogether. Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the
social workers tell us that the only thing to do with them
to allow social workers to work with the remainder of the
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that hardened
core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is designed for
that purpose. Ah, so the second page deals with the
enhanced penalties. The third page is a list of crimes
that are effected by this bill and an important aspect of
this bill that I hope will placate those that are worried
about enhanced penalties, across this, I see John look at
me right in the eyes. Because John and I have agreed on a
lot of things and both of agree that enhanced penalties are
something that has to be proven that there's a need for
before you talk about it because a lot of enhanced
penalties don't do anything more than create problems for
the corrections. But this enhanced penalty, we have got to
get that hard core of the street gang groups off of the
streets, out of the street gangs. Ah, to soften the
enhanced penalty, if you'll notice on the last page, page
five of the bill, ah, the sentencing judge, rather than the
jury, shall decide whether to impose the penalty. We are
not going to make any effort to take the judicial
discretion out of this penalty phase. It will give the
judge the right, if he feels that that individual needs to
be taken out of that situation for this enhanced period of
time, the judge still has the discretion to either take him
out for an enhanced period of time or - him, I shouldn't
use him - take this person out for enhanced period of time
or not. Ah, I think that the bill is self explanatory and
thar it does have the support of the Statewide Police Chief
Association and the Statewide Prosecuting Attorneys
Ussociation, ah, the bill came from them as an answer to a
problem that we brought to them. And I'd stand to ask,
answer, any questions, ah, ...
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Speaker of the House:
Representatives to the bill, Representative Millner?
Representative Millner:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. First of all, I'd like to declare
a conflict because I am a member of a street gang. I
thought I'd get your attention with that. Om, I happen to
have a group of young children in my neighborhood who are
the siblings of members of street gangs. And, ah, in
trying to perhaps dissuade them from criminal activities,
we've formulated our own street gang, and of course our
intents and purposes are perhaps to be, urn, good for the
neighborhood, and urn, ah, we tried to take on little
projects for that. But, I stand in support of this bill,
but I do want to kind of state some concerns that I have,
and that it that many times we have failed in our society
to address in the concerns of our youth, which lead to
juvenile street gangs, and I feel that many young people
who come from broken homes and who don't have the
environmental supports, or perhaps church support systems,
kind of fall between the cracks. And so we have a
responsibility, each one of us, if we see these young
people, who get caught up in criminal activities, to try
and become their friends and encourage them to get out of
that kind of activity and lead them light, and so I stand
in support of this bill, but I also want to send a
message. And that message is that we need to provide
opportunities for these young people, educational
opportunities and employment for those who particularly get
involved in juvenile crimes, and ah, so they don't get into
drugs and other activities. And so I support the bill,
thank you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Hales?
Representative Hales:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would like to speak in support
of this very important legislation. Z have a good citizen
in my district who is in the business of coin operated game
machines. Ah, he operates in several states, Utah is one
of these, and he said in the past three or four months,
these gang groups have cost him, as well as the stores, ah,
Shopko, Smith's Pood King, as much as thirty thousand
dollars in just a very short period of time. But he said
in addition to the theft, and the property damage that has
occurred, he has been really concerned about the
aggressiveness of these groups. He said that very often
these thefts occur during the time that the stores are
open, sometimes at night when there's one night clerk on,
they intimidate the night clerk. And as I became aware of
this problem, and have visited with more people, I don't
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think we're really talking about these neighborhood
children that Representative Millner has talked about/
although it could be* Ah, they say that these groups are
sophisticated enough that they know what the state laws
are, and very often they will move around according to what
the state law is that handles this kind of theft and this
kind of aggression and property damage. So I urge your
support of this legislation. I think it's really important
and I have my hat off to those who've, a Senator Pordham
and those who have brought this to our attention. Thank
you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative, ah, Tuttle?
Representative Tuttle:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I stand in support of this bill
also. In the Magna times issue this summer, there was an
article and pictures about the grafitti that was put in the
buildings in Magna by different groups that are either
copycatcing the groups in California or members, and I
think it's well needed and I think we should support this.
Thank you.
Speaker of the Eouse:
Representative Bush?
Representative Bush:
Oops. Thank you Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this •
bill and I would ... Representative.. .sorry, Representative
Rushton and Senator Pordham for looking into this. There's
no sense waiting until our state becomes like some of these
other areas of the country before we start doing something
about it. I don't have any special horror stories to tell,
but ah, this, I think this is one of the most important
pieces of legislation we've had, and I commend thea for it
and ask you to support it.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Prante?
Representative Prante:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, will the sponsor yield to a
question?
Representative Rushton:
Yeah^
Speaker of the House:
Sponsor yields, proceed.
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Representative Prante:
He f s sitting right next to me, but I just want this
clarified for myself. It's bard to ask him when he's on
the microphone. Ah, the question I have is I'm ail for
what the bill's doing, but the question I have and perhaps,
ah, Representative Rushton can respond to it, is that when
it refers to that a person commits a — two or more people
committing a crime, and ah, such crimes as burglary and
criminal trespass being those kind of crimes, I'm wondering
if anytime two people, especially young people who haven't
learned, maybe are yielding to impulse sometimes, and
aren't members of actual gangs, how does it impact on them?
Representative Rushton:
The answer to these question probably would be better
answered by a lawyer than by me, but I'm told that it is
contained in the following paragraph when it talks about
the concert action of two or more persons. Ah, it's also
will fall, the problem that be talks about if if just two
people commit burglary together does this constitute group
criminal activities? Or three people it would have to be.
You got the two people and the individual, the individual
who does this in concern with two other people. Ah, I
think that the best cover here is in the judicial
discretion that's allowed in the last page. Ah, and the
definition of concert action between these people - a legal
definition.
Representative Prante:
Where's the definition?
Representative Rushton:
Ah, it's in section 76-2-202. Yeah, well, that's the
judicial.
Representative Prante:
Maybe you could just read the section that's applicable to
this, Representative, that shows the court's discretion?
Representative Rushton:
I don't have my book with me.
Representative Prante:
~
Oh. Okay-* Maybe ah, an attorney can comment on this. My
conceth isn't with what it's doing, it's with, what if two
people_steal apples off a tree? Or what if two people
"Impossibly, impulsively take something from a home, are
they suddenly convicted of essentially gang activities? ...
Ah, I see there is the court discretion in it. Okay, thank
you.
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Representative Rushton:
Yeah, that's what I was saying, that, thank you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Puller?
Representative Fuller:
Thank you, Mr* Speaker.

Call for a previous question?

Speaker of the House:
Previous question has been called. All in favor of the
previous question say "Aye"? Opposed "no9!
Motion
carries. Representative Rushton*) you may sum up.
Representative Rushton:
I could talk all night on gang problems in my neighborhood
and all I have to say is when you see a young person with
the blue skull cap of the California Crips 'gang in your
neighborhood, if you're not scared, you don't understand
what's going on. And ah, this law is directed at the core,
it's not directed, as Joann has expressed, kids that are at
risk, you see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap
turned around backwards on the West, or they sign each
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each gang
has its own finger sign. Ah, these people that are at
risk, and these are kids at risk. This bill is directed at
that core criminal element, that three percent of those six
hundred gang members that have been identified that provide
the father figure in these gangs. And they provide also
the connection the California gangs, the connection to the
crack cocaine, the money that is fueling this explosion of
gang activity in our cities and I'd like to ask you for
your support for this bill and thank you for your time.
Speaker of the House:
Voting's open on Senate Bill 52. ... It appears to the
chair that all present have voted. Voting is closed on
Senate Bill 52. Senate Bill 52 has received SI affirmative
and no negative votes passes
this House.
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Senate Floor debates on Senate Bill 52
January 23 and 24, 1990
January 23/ 1990
Senator Fordham:
Ah/ Mr. President and fellow Senators, this is an important
bill. Ahf we've worked on this bill since the middle of
the summer/ worked with the Attorney General's Office/ with
prosecuting attorneys in this state, with other divisions
of enforcement in this state. Originally, we bad a bill
called the "Organization Gang Bill." In ah working with
California, who this bill was patterned after, their billf
and after they passed their law, we had an influx of gang
members coming from California and infiltrating into Otab
and establishing residence here and working as ah in their
organization as members of, who had broken off from the
California gangs. I think we need to send a message to
these organized people that there isn't a place for them in
Utah. Now we've had, in working with California, their
problem was that it was so difficult to prove that a
individual was a member of an organized gang. We changed
our bill to read "Group Criminal Activity" and it involves
when two or more commit a crime/ then they're subject to
the penalties that are made in this law. And ah let me
just read what/ quickly if I can, a class B misdemeanor/
the individual shall serve a minimum of ninety consecutive
days in the jail. If the offense is a class A misdemeanor/
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term of a
hundred and eighty consecutive days. If the offense is a
third degree felony the convicted person shall be sentenced
to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. If
the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person
shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years
in prison. And if the. offense is a first degree felony,
the person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term
of nine years in prison. We felt that we need to make very
'restrictive [sic], and these, ah these charges would be
administered and sentenced by the judge without always
going to a jury hearing. It would depend on the ah crime
that was committed if they had a jury hearing. I have many
clippings/ too many to go over/ let me just read you the
heads of some of these that happens in our state. "Warning
signs blew up at side of girl's bed," and this is in
school, ah Kearns. Here's, "Suspect arrested in shooting
at a market." This is in December 28 of last year.
"Police believe two arrested teens belong to dangerous new
cangr" "Gang fight leaves three stabbed." "Street gang
fires on a family/ two die." "Spray painted grafitti/" and
this bill covers those actsf that if it's this kind of
destruction of property is committed by two or more people,
there's a penalty for them and they're, it's just something
that we need to adopt to control this. Now in working with
the prosecutors/ they felt that it was very difficult under
the gang bill to identify these people with the gangs.
8

California, in working with them and talking with them, ah,
wishes that they had developed their law the way we're
developing this one in Otah. It would be much more
enforceable by them. How I might just show you the volume
here is the California gang law that they have. So if
there are any questions that I could respond to, Ifd be
glad to, Mr. President.
President of the Senate:
Senator Chuck Peterson?
Senator Chuck Peterson:
Mr. Fordham, ah, Senator Fordham, is this differentiate, is
it the location code a differentiation between juvenile and
other people, I mean, ah, would your bill apply to
juveniles under eighteen?
Senator Fordham:
It would apply to any crime that was committed by two or
more persons.
Senator Chuck Peterson:
That's what I'm wondering about. I'll have to ask the
legal people on the Senate, the lawyers, whether or not
this is possible for us to pass legislation that would
apply to, that would provide these penalties for a
juvenile. I just don't know whether or not we can do
that. Senator Hillyard?
Senator Hillyard:
My problem when I read that Senator Peterson is the fact
that there's three of us here together and that may
constitute a criminal gang.
Senator Chuck Peterson:
That's for sure. I think it does.
question about that.

Yeah, I, there's no

Senator Hillyard:
I would say this. The general law defining juveniles in
that section would override this unless there is a specific
mention of that and I'd have to look at the law. I was not
on the committee when this bill was debated, ah, I had
another conflict that took me out of these bills9
I have
not had a chance to see that but I think that's a
legitimate question that staff who drafted the bill could
answer.
President of the-Senate:
Senator Steel?

9

Senator Steele:
Thank you, Kr. President, I have a question as it relate to
ah, relates to a potential in our state of moving towards
what's termed in many states, "shock incarceration". In
quick summary, as a listing, first time felons, for
example, ages eighteen through twenty six are placed in
some states in a ninety day incarceration boot camp
environment. The recidivism, the impact on those
particular individuals in the cites that I noted, I've had
discussion with, seems to be very effective and very
appealing and our state is looking as possible alternatives
to what we're currently doing. Would these minimum, my
question, these minimum requirements, ah circumvent that
process?
Senator Pordham:
I don't think that it would circumvent it, I think they
would be part of. The judge has the authority to say where
these individuals would be incarcerated or be subjected to
review or whatever, as I understand it, the judge would be
able to put these people where they, where he felt that it
would be the most good for them.
President of the Senate:
Further questions of Senator Pordham? Senator Cornaby, are
you voting on that one... I don't see any further questions
then.
Unidentified speaker:
I move for' the adoption of the bill.
President of the Senate:
Question has been called, for the question shall Senate
Bill 52 be read for the third time?
[Senators vote orally]
Senate Bill 52 shows twenty five ayes, no nays, four being absent,
the bill passes, to be placed on the third reading calendar.

January 24, 1990
President of the Senate:
Senator McCallister?
Senator Pordham
Personal prTvilege Mr.

ADDENDUM C
California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
Act," Cal. Penal Code § 186.20 et seq. (Supp. 1996)

Chapter 11
STREET TERRORISM ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION ACT
Section
186.20.
186.21.
186.22.

186.22a.

Section
Citation.
Legislative findings and declaration.
Participation in criminal street gang;
punishment; felony conviction; sentence enhancement; commission on or
near school grounds; pattern of criminal gang activity.
Buildings or places used by criminal
street gangs; nuisance; additional
remedies; confiscation of firearms or

186.23.
186.24.
186.25.
18626.
18627.
186.28.

deadly or dangerous weapons owned
or possessed by gang members.
Mutual aid activities; labor organizations.
Severability.
Local laws; preemption.
Criminal street gang; violent coercion to
participate; offense.
Duration of chapter.
Firearms; supply, sell or give possession; participation in criminal street
gangs.

Chapter 11 was added by Stats.1988, & 12*2, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1,
eff Sept 26, 1988.
Repeal
Chapter 11 is repealed Jan. 1, 1997, by the provisions of § 186.27.
Law Review Commentaries
Gang evidence: Issues for criminal defense. Susan L.
Burrell, 30 Santa Clara L.Rev. 739 (1990).

§ 18620.

Citation

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "California Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act."
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.)
Additions or changes indicated by underline; deletions by asterisks * * *
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Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Section 5 of Stats.1988, c 1256, provides:
"On or before January 1, 1991, the District Attorney of
Los Angeles County and the City Attorney of the City of
Los Angeles shall submit a report to the Legislature on
the effect of this act on the control of criminal street gang
activity in the County of Los Angeles, The report shall
include, but need not be limited to, aD of the following:
"(a) The number of arrests under this act
"(b) The number of prosecutions under this act

"(c) The number of trials which have resulted from
prosecutions under this act, and the number of pleas
which resulted.
"(d) The number of convictions under this act
"(e) The number and type of sentence enhancements
which have been sought under this act, and the number
and kind which have been ordered by the courts.
"(f) 'Hie number of nuisance abatement actions under
this act*
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, see Government Code
$ 9606.

} 186.21. Legislative findings and declaration
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it is the right of every person, regardless of race, color,
creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, sexual orientation, or handicap, to be secure and protected from
fear, intimidation, and physical harm caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals. It is not
the intent of this chapter to interfere with the exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of freedom
of expression and association. The Legislature hereby recognizes the constitutional right of every citizen
to harbor and express beliefs on any lawful subject whatsoever, to lawfully associate with others who
share similar beliefs, to petition lawfully constituted authority for a redress of perceived grievances, and
to participate in the electoral process.
The Legislature, however, further finds that the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been
caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes
against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively,
present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected. The
Legislature finds that there are nearly 600 criminal street gangs operating in California, and that the
number of gang-related murders is increasing. The Legislature also finds that in Los Angeles County
alone there were 328 gang-related murders in 1986, and that gang homicides in 1987 have increased 80
percent over 1986. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of
criminal activity by street gangs by focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the
organized nature of street gangs, which together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs.
The Legislature further finds that an effective means of punishing and deterring the criminal activities of
street gangs is through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or
used by street gangs.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eft Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eft Sept 26, 1988.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same 3ession of the legislature, see Government Code
§ 9605.
§ 1F6.22. Participation in criminal street gang; punishment; felony conviction; sentence enhancement; commission on or near school grounds; pattern of criminal gang activity
(a) Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in
a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or
2 or 3 years.
(by I) Except as provided in paragraph (4), any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to
promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony,
in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he
or she has been convicted, be punished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at the court's
discretion * * *.
(2) If the underlying felony described in paragraph (1) is committed on the grounds of, or within 1,000
feet of, a public or private elementary, vocational, junior high, or high school, during hours in which the
facility is open for classes or school related programs or when minors are using the facility, the additional
term shall be two, three, or four years, at the court's discretion. * * *
Additions or changes Indicated by underline; deletions by asterisks * * *
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(3) The court shall order the imposition of the middle term of the sentence enhancement, unless there
are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. The court shall state the reasons for its choice of
sentence enhancements on the record at the time of the sentencing.
(4) Any person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.
(c) If the court grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence imposed upon the defendant for
a violation of subdivision (a), or in cases involving a true finding of the enhancement enumerated in
subdivision (b), the court shall require that the defendant serve a minimum of 180 days in a county jail as
a condition thereof.
(d) Notwithstanding any other law, the court may strike the additional punishment for the enhancements provided in this section or refuse to impose the minimum jail sentence for misdemeanors in an
unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served, if the court specifies on the record and
enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best be served by
that disposition.
(e) As used in this chapter, "pattern of criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted
commission, or solicitation of two or more of the following offenses, provided at least one of those offenses
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those offenses occurred within three years
after a prior offense, and the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons:
(1) Assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, as defined
in Section 245.
(2) Robbery, as defined in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 211) of Title 8 of Part 1.
(3) Unlawful homicide or manslaughter, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 187) of Title
8 of Part 1.
(4) The sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture
controlled substances as defined in Sections 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, and 11058 of the Health and
Safety Code.
(5) Shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle, as defined in Section 246.
(6) Discharging or permitting the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle, as defined in
subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 12034.
(7) Arson, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 450) of Title 13.
(8) The intimidation of witnesses and victims, as defined in Section 136.1.
(9) Grand theft, as defined in Section 487, when the value of the money, labor, or real or personal
property taken exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
(10) Grand theft of any vehicle, trailer, or vessel, as described in Section 487h.
(11) Burglary, as defined in Section 459.
(12) Rape, as defined in Section 261.
(13) Looting, as defined in Section 463.
(14) Moneylaundering, as defined in Section 186.10.
(15) Kidnapping, as defined in Section 207.
(16) Mayhem, as defined in Section 203.
(17) Aggravated mayhem, as defined in Section 205.
(18) Torture, as defined in Section 206.
(19) Felony extortion, as defined in Sections 518 and 520.
(20) Felony vandalism, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 594.
(21) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(22) The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm as described in Section 12072.
(23) Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person in
violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 12101.
(f) As used in this chapter, "criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, association, or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the
commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (23), inclusive, of
Additions or changes Indicated by underline; deletions by asterisks * * *
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subdivision (e), having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(g) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and on that date is repealed.
(Added by Stats.1989, c 930, $ 5.1, operative Jan. 1, 1993. Amended by Stats.1991, c. 201 (A.B.I135),
§ 1, operative Jan. 1, 1993; Stats.1991, c. 661 (A.B.1866), § 2, operative Jan. 1, 1993; Stats.1993, c. 601
(S.B.724), § 1; Stats.1993, c. 610 (A.B.6), § 3, eff. Oct 1,1993; Stats.1993, c. 611 (S.B.60), § 3, e£f. Oct 1,
1993; Statl993, c. 1125 (AB.1630), § 3; Stats.1994, c. 47 (S.B.480), § 1, eff. April 19,1994; Stats.1994, c,
451 (A.B.2470), § 1; Stata.1995, c. 377 (S.B.1095), § 2.)
Repeal
Section 186,22 is repealed by its ovm terms on Jan. 2, 1997.
Historical and Statutory Notes
1989 Legislation
Section 12.5 of Stats.1989, c 930 provides:
"Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 8.1, 9.1, and 11.1 of this act shall
become operative on January 1, 1993, unless a later
enacted statute, which is enacted before January 1, 1993,
changes that date."
1991 Legislation
The 1991 amendment inserted the provision relating to
the additional term imposed when the underlying felony is
committed on the grounds of or within 1,000 feet of
certain schools; and added provisions relating to the
operative date and the repeal of the section.
Effect of amendment of section by two or more acts at
the same session of the legislature, see Government Code
§ 9605.
1992 Legislation
Former § 186.22, added by Stats.1988, c 1242, 5 1;
Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, amended by Stats.1989, c 144,
§ 1; Stats.1989, c 930, § 5; Stats.1991, c 661 (AB.1866),
§ 1, rel&ting to similar subject matter, was repealed by its
own terms effective Jan. 1, 1998.
1993 Legislation
The 1993 amendment by c 611 inserted subd (eX8)
relating to carjacking.
Section affected by two or more acts at the same
session of the legislature, see Government Code § 9605.
Amendments of this section by §§ 3.02, 3.06, 3.08, 3.09,
3.1, 3 4 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 of State.
1993, c. 611, failed to become operative under the provisions of § 41 of that Act
Amendments of this section by §§ 3.02, 3.06, 3.08, 3.09,
3.1, 3 4 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 of Stats.
1993 c. 610, failed to become operative under the provisions of § 36 of that Act.
The 1993 amendment by c 1125 added subd, (eX8)
relating to grand theft of a vehicle; deleted former subd.
(e)(8), which read "Carjacking, as defined in Section 215";
deleted subd (g) which provided an operative date of Jan.
1, 1993; redesignated as 3ubd. (g) former subd. (h); in
subd. (g), deleted "unless a later enacted statute which is
enacted before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends that
date"; and made other nonsubstantive changes.
1994 Legislation
The 1994 amendment, by c. 47, in subd (a), substituted
"16 months, or 2 or 3 years" for "one, two, or three
}earsn; in subd. (b)(1), deleted "which is" following "who

is convicted of a felon/*; rewrote subd, (c); in subd (d),
deleted "provision of" foDowing "Notwithstanding any other"; in subd (e), redesignated as pars. (7) and (8) former
pars. (6) and (7), inserted par. (6) relating to discharge of
afirearmfroma motor vehicle, redesignated as par. (10)
former par. (8), and inserted pars, (9) and (11) to (21)
relating, respectively, to grand theft exceeding $10,000,
burglary, rape, looting, money laundering, kidnapping,
mayhem, aggravated mayhem, torture, felony extortion,
felony vandalism and carjacking; and in subd (f), substituted "(21)" for "(8)", substituted "having" for "which has"
following "subdivision (eT and inserted "and" following
"symbol,". Prior to amendment, subd (c) read:
"(c) Any person who is convicted of a public offense
punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor, which is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, any criminal street gang, with the specific intent
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by
gang members, shaD be punished by imprisonment in a
county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in
the state prison for one, two, or three years, provided that
any person sentenced to imprisonment in a county jafl
shall be imprisoned for a period not to exceed one year,
but not less than 180 days, and shaD not be eligible for
release upon completion of sentence, parole, or any other
basis, until he or she has served 180 days. If the court
grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence
imposed upon the defendant, it shall require as a condition
thereof that the defenaant serve 180 days in a county
jafl."
The 1994 amendment by c. 451 added subd. (e)(22)
relating to 3ale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm; and
added subd (eX23) relating to possession.
The 1994 amendment of this section by c. 451 (A.B.2470)
explicitly amended the 1994 amendment of this section by
c 47 (S.B.480).
Section 17 of Stats.1994, c 451 (A.B.2470), provides:
"This bill shaD become operative only if Assembly Bill
2428 of the 199&-94 Regular Session of the Legislature
[Stats.1994, c 454] is chaptered and becomes effective on
or before January 1, 1995."
1995 Legislation
The 1995 amendment, in subd (b)(1), substituted "paragraph (4)" for "paragraph (2)"; in subd. (b), inserted
paragraph designations (2) and (3); in subd. (b)(2), inserted "described in paragraph (1)" following "felony"; redesignated as subd. (bX4) former subd. (bX2); and made
nonsubstantive changes throughout

Cross References
Firearm possession during street gang crimes, sentence
enhancement, see Penal Code § 12021.5.

Juvenile court rules related to this section, see California Rules of Court, rule 1404.
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Code of Regulations References

Gang, definition, see 15 CaL Code of Regs. § 3000.

Law Review Commentaries
Review of selected 1989 California legislation. 21 Pac.
LJ. 425 (1990).
Review of selected 1993 California legislation. 25 Pac
LJ. 513 (1994).

Review of selected 1994 California legislation. 26 Pac.
LJ. 202 (1995).

Library References
California Jury Instructions—Criminal [CALJIC].

United States Supreme Court
Death penalty, admissibility of evidence, gang membership, freedom of association, see Dawson v. Delaware,

1992,112 S.Ct 1093,117 L.Ed^d 309, on remand 608 KM
1201, appeal after remand 637 A^d 57.

Notes of Decisions
In general L8
Active participation 5
Admissibility of evidence 7.5
Bifurcation 10
Common name or identifying symbol
Due process L5
Expert testimony 7.6
Gang purposes or benefit 9
Injunction 12
Instructions 11
Ongoing organization 3
Pattern of activity 3J>
Predicate offense 7
Presumptions and burden of proof 2
Primary activity 4
Sufficiency of evidence 8
Validity 1

required to invoke its provisions. In re Alberto R. (App.
4 Dist 1991) 1 CaiRptr^d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309.
"Promote, further, or assist" as used in statute providing for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of
felony as criminal street gang member was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad inasmuch as phrase had
been consistently used by courts to describe aiding and
abetting. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 CaL
Rptr.2d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309.

L Validity
"Benefit" as used in statute providing for sentence
enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal
street gang member where felony is for benefit of street
gang was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when
term was read in conjunction with statute's qualifying
language so as to limit scope to only those acts committed
with specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members. In re Alberto R.
(App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d
1309.
Phrase "and the last of those offenses occurred within
three years after a prior offense," which was part of
definition of "pattern of criminal gang activity" contained
in Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, was
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, despite defendant's anticipated scenarios in which gang members could
be charged for crimes in future of which they had no
knowledge and in which they did not participate. In re
Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235
CaLApp.3d 1309.
"Primary activities" as used in statutory definition of
"criminal street gang" whose members could receive sentence enhancement if convicted of felony as member was
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad despite contention that enforcement would be arbitrary based on who
made decision of what gang's primary activities were;
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention .Art, of
which phrase was part, specifically listed felonious conduct

Statute making it offense to actively participate in
criminal street gang activity and providing for sentence
enhancement based on that activity is not unconstitutionally overbroad. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1
CaLRptr^d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309.
Statute providing for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member
did not violate equal protection despite defendant's characterization of enhancement as being similar to crime of
conspiracy, which included procedural safeguards that
enhancement did not; conspiracy required agreement
with others to commit offense, while enhancement statute
required active participation in felonious criminal gang
activity, and defendant subject to enhancement was not
similarly situated to defendant charged with conspiracy.
In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235
CaLApp.3d 1309.
Statutory provision pursuant to which defendant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member was
subject to sentence enhancement if felony was convicted
with "specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members" provided adequate
notice of what conduct was proscribed and was not unconstitutionally vague. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1
Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 Cal.App.3d 1309.
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act and
its provision for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member did not
vest unfettered discretion; Act specifically designated
crimes in which gang had to be involved. In re Alberto R.
(App. 4 Dist. 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 CalApp.3d
1309.
When narro-;y construed to pertain only to conduct
that was purely felonious. i.e., punishable in state prison,
phrase felonious criminal conduct" as used in statute
making it offense to promote, further, or assist such
conduct by gang members was not unconstitutionally
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Note 3,5
vague or overbroad. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991)
1 CaLRptrJW 348, 235 CaLAppJJd 1309.
Sentence enhancement for "membership* in criminal
street gang was not unconstitutionally vague. People v.
Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 Cal.
App.3d 967.
Sentence enhancement provision for crimes committed
in association with criminal street gang, with specific
intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct of
members of gang, did not violate due process, even though
it did not require proof that defendant was aware of
predicate offenses committed by other gang members.
People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235
Cal.App.3d 957.
Sentence enhancement provision for participation in
"criminal street gang" was not unconstitutionally overbroad; statute regulated criminal conduct, not speech or
association, and there was no right of association to
engage in mminal conduct People v. Gamez (App. 4
Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 CalApp.3d 957.
Sentence enhancement provision for participation in
"mminal street gang" was not unconstitutionally vague;
statutory definition clarified that it was not mere association with others, but rather association with others for
purpose of committing crime, where association's very
existence was founded upon commission of crime, that was
prohibited. People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286
CaLRptr. 894, 235 CaLApp.3d 967.
Fact that terms of this section were not perfectly
defined or may not have been defined precisely did not
invalidate section under due process clause. People v.
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL
App.3d 692.
The term "criminal street gang," as used in this section
was sufficiently defined and did not render section unconstitutionally vague under due process clause; section did
not make it criminal to be member ot undefined "gang"
but prohibited membership in criminal street gang which
was de&ned as any ongoing organization, association, or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission
of one or more enumerated criminal acts. People v.
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL
App.3d 692.
The phrase **knowledge of pattern of criminal gang
activity" was not unconstitutionally vague under due process clause; term "knowledge" was often used in criminal
law meaning awareness of particular facts proscribed in
criminal statutes and "pattern of criminal gang activity"
was defined in this section. People v. Green (App. 1 Dist
199H 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaLApp.3d 692.
The phrase i4willfoJly promotes, furthers, or assists in
any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang"
was not unconstitutionally vague under due process
clause; similarity of phrase with that employed in determining if person is aider and abettor indicated that phrases should be viewed as anonymous. People v. Green
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaLApp.3d 692.
Although phrase "felonious criminal conduct" had some
uncertainty, it could be construed to cover only conduct
which was clearly felonious, i.e., which amounted to commission of offense punishable by imprisonment in state
prison and, as so construed, this section was not unconstitutionally vague under due process clause. People v.
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL
App.3d 692.

Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228
CaLApp.3d 990.
1.8. In general
Mere membership in street gang is not a crime. People
ex reL Gailo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 1996) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d
589, 34 CaLApp.4th 136, review granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 680, 899 P.2d 66.
2.

Presumptions and burden of proof
In prosecution for OTninal street gang offense or when
state is seeking criminal street gang sentence enhancement it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove through
competent evidence the elements of a criminal street gang
as set out in the statute, including the offenses necessary
to satisfy the pattern requirement People v. GardeJey
(App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 136, 30 CaLApp.4th 402,
34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and opinion superseded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115.
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when
state is seeking CTiminal street gang sentence enhancement, while a gang expert can give opinion as to whether
predicate crime was act in furtherance of gang activities if
such testimony on ultimate issue would assist trier of fact,
if, as a basis for that opinion, expert is not relying on facts
he had observed, or of which he had personal knowledge,
or that were given to him as an assumption from evidence
introduced in the case, his testimony can only be elicited
in the form of hypothetical question, and that opinion, in
turn, stands or falls depending, initially, upon whether
trier of fact finds assumed facts to be true or false from
evidence introduced to establish existence of such facta.
People v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 CaLRptr^d 136,
30 CaLApp.4th 402, 34 CaLApp.4th 1614, review granted
and opinion superseded 39 CaLKptr^d 406, 890 ?2d 1116.
For mminal street gang sentence enhancement to be
found true, there must be substantial evidence to support
finding of existence of "criminal street gang" members
engaged in "pattern of criminal gang activity." Matter of
Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282 CaLRptr. 76, 230 CaL
App.3d 1455, review denied
Pattern of criminal gang activity used to support sentence enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not
require that the pattern of criminal street gang activity be
shown by instances of purposeful gang activity. In re
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228
Cal.App.3d 990.
Enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not require
proof of two different offenses rather than two instances
of the same offense. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist
1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
3.

Ongoing organization
Element of "criminal 3treet gang" for sentence enhancement pursuant to California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act that there be an ongoing
organization of three or more persons was met by testimony of juvenile witnesses identifying at least three participants in particular incident as members of a street gang,
testimony that there was a membership roD written on a
wall, and that members, friends, and supporters of the
group were capable of concerted action. In re Nathaniel
C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLAppAi
990.
3.5. Pattern of activity
Pattern of criminal gang activity element of offense of
participating in criminal street gang does not require
proof of prior enumerated offense, but rather may be
based on incident for which defendant is on triaL People
v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist. 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33
Cal.App.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review

1.5. Due process
Due process requires pleading enhancement under this
chapter and requires proof of each fact required. In re
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granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr.2d 678, 899
P.2d64.
Single incident, even incident on which current prosecution is based, can provide factual basis to find pattern of
criminal gang activity required to support conviction for
participating in criminal street gang. People v. Loeun
(App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cai.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th
1609, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review granted
and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 678, 899 P2d 64.
Evidence supported finding of pattern of criminal gang
activity required to support defendant's conviction for
participating in criminal street gang, based on predicate
offenses of two separate assaults with deadly weapons by
gang members; defendant hit victim with bat and another
member of same gang hit victim numerous times with
long, thin object People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40
CaLRptr^d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125,
as modified, review granted and opinion superseded 43
Cal.Rptr. 2d 678, 899 P.2d 64.
Under "continuous course of conduct" exception to unanimity requirement, jurors did not have to unanimously
agree on which two of several possible predicate offenses
established that gang had engaged in pattern of criminal
activity, and thus was "criminal street gang," in order to
find defendant guilty of knowingly participating in criminal street gang and to impose enhanced punishment based
on finding that murder was committed in association with
such gang; pertinent element of definition of criminal
street gang, Le., organization whose members engage in
"pattern of criminal gang activity" contemplated continuous course of conduct
People v. Funes (App. 1 Dist
1994) 28 CaLRptr^d 758, 23 CaLApp.4th 1506, modi^ed on
denial of rehearing, review denied.
4.

Primary activity
Requirement for enhancement of sentence pursuant to
this chapter that the primary activity of the street gang at
issue be crirninal activity is a proper subject of expert
opinion. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279
CaLRptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
Testimony by police officer, qualified as an expert, that
primary activity of all the gangs in his area was criminal
and that one of the crimes they committed was assault
with a deadly weapon was insufficient to show that particular gang whose conduct was at issue with respect to
enhancement pursuant to this chapter had criminal activity as a primary activity; expert did not identify the gang
as one of the gangs in his area and the list of crimes which
he said gangs commit included only one of the eight
offenses specified in the statute. In re Nathaniel C. (App.
1 Dist 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
FCJTUS of this chapter is narrower than general criminal
conduct; evidence supporting enhancement pursuant to
the Act must establish that a primary activity of the gang
is one or more of listed offenses. In re Nathaniel C. (App.
1 Dist. 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
5,

Active participation
Sentence enhancement provision for "active participation " in criminal street gang was not unconstitutionally
vague; to be convicted, defendant must have more than
nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical relationship
with gang, and person must devote all, or substantia] part
of his time and efforts to criminal street gang. People v.
Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 Cal.
App.3d 957.
To be convicted of being active participant in street
gang, defendant must have relationship with criminal
street gang which is more than nominal, passive, inactive
or purely technical, and defendant must devote all, or
substantial part of his time and efforts to criminal street

gang. People v. Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr.
140, 227 CaLApp.3d 692.
The terms "actively participate'* and "membership"
gang were not unconstitutionally vague under due process
clause; term "member'* had ordinary meaning and had
also been judicially de&ned to mean a person who bears
relationship to organization that is not accidental, artificial
or unconsciously in appearance only and the phrase "actively participate,n in context, had same meaning as "active membership" as defined by case law. People v.
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL
App.3d 692.
6.

Common name or identifying symbol
Association of multiple names with a gang satisfies
requirement of this chapter that the gang have a common
name or common identifying sign or symbol, as long as at
least one name is common to the gang's members. In re
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228
Cal.App.3d 990.
Element of criminal street gang for sentence enhancement purposes pursuant to California Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention Act that the organization
have a common name or common identifying sign or
symbol was met by evidence that its members were
known by two names and that there was graffiti which
signified the gang, although no particular ct: lor or clothing
was associated with gang membership. In re Nathaniel
C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d
990.

7. Predicate offense
"Pattern of criminal gang activity" cannot be established for sentence enhancement purposes by use of predicate crimes that occur after the crime for which the
defendant is being tried. People v. Godinez (App. 2 Dist
1993) 22 CaLRptr^d 164, 17 CaLApp.4th 1363, review
denied.
For purposes of juvenile proceeding, robbery, murder,
and attempted murder of rival gang member were crimes
committed on "separate occasions" within meaning of
criminal street gang sentence enhancement statute, since
juvenile had reasonable opportunity to reflect on actions
in eight hours between robbery and attempted murder.
Matter of Jose T. (App. * Dist 1991) 282 Cal.Rptr. 75, 230
CaLApp.3d 1465, review denied.
For purpose of juvenile proceeding, robbery, murder
and attempted murder which were committed by two or
more persons constituted qualifying predicate offenses for
imposition of street gang sentencing enhancement, pursuant to requirement that predicate offenses must have been
committed on separate occasions or by two or more
persons. Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282
Cal.Rptr. 75, 230 CaL\pp.3d 1455, review denied
If there had been competent proof that one member of
gang had shot another, that would have sufficed to show a
predicate offense for a pattern of criminal gang activity
under the enhancement provisions of this chapter; this
section does not exempt from its scope those predicate
offenses committed by gang members as part of internal
gang disputes or power struggles. In re Nathaniel C.
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
Enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not require
that each predicate offense be committed by two or more
person*; it requires only that the offenses be committed
on separate occasions or be committed by two or more
persons. In re Nathaniel C. ^App. 1 Dist 1991) 279
Cal.Rptr. 236. 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
Evidence established time that predicate offenses for
enhancement of sentence pursuant to this chapter occurred; evidence showed that one of the offenses was
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incident on October 12, 1989, which gave rise to charges
against juvenile and that a second assault by gang member? occurred ua few months" before the March 1990
hearing, thus showing that at least one of the predicate
offenses occurred after September 23, 1988, the effective
date of the chapter, and that one predicate offense occurred within three years of the first In re Nathaniel C.
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
7.5. Admissibility of evidence
Hearsay from police reports and conversations with
investigating officers concerning charged incident, as well
as other information gathered by police in field, is reasonable basis for officer's expert opinion on matters related to
criminal street gang, but officer may not simply recite
what he was told and must provide foundational testimony
for opinions which is sufficiently corroborated by other
competent physical and testimonial evidence. People v.
Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 Cal
App.4th 1509, 38 CalApp.4th 1125, as modified, review
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr 2d 678, 899
P.2d64.
Other acts evidence of defendant's ^ang related activities was admissible to reveal circumstances of first-degree
murder and to prove street gang enhancement; the evidence was not directed at disposition to commit other
crimes. People v. Martin (App. 6 Dist 1994) 28 Cal
Rptr^d 660, 23 CaLApp.4th 76, modified on denial of
rehearing, review denied.
7.6. Expert testimony
Expert witness had reasonable basis to give testimony
and opinions that assaults with deadly weapons were one
of primary activities of gang, for purposes of establishing
offense of participation in criminal street gang, in light of
expert's background and training, personal knowledge and
experience with gang of which defendant was alleged to
be member, information gathered from contact and conversations with members of gang, and information contained in police department's files. People v. Loeun (App.
6 Dist 1995) 40 CaLRpn\2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 1509, 38
Cal.App.4th 1125, as modified, review granted and opinion
superseded 43 CaLRptr .2d 678, 899 P.2d 64.
Fact that expert witness relied in part on hearsay about
particular incident did not render improper or inadmissible expert's opinion that assaults with deadly weapons
were one of primary activities of gang, for purposes of
establishing offense of participation in criminal street
gang, in light of expert's further reliance on personal
knowledge, observations, experience and investigation,
and in light of particularity of hearsay used by expert
People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 CaLRptr .2d 160, 33
CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr.2d 678, 899
P.2d 64.
8. Sufficiency of evidence
Opinion of expert witness coupled with circumstances of
alleged attack by defendant and other gang members
supported finding that one of street gang's primary activities was commission of assaults with deadly weapons,
which thus supported conviction for participating in criminal street gang; expert explained motivation of gang to
commit assaults and gang's history of assaults, and
charged incident involved apparent attempt to protect
gang's turf. People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40
Cai.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CalA.pp.4th 1509, 38 Cal.App.4th 1125,
as modified, review granted and opinion superseded 43
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, S99 P.2d 64.
Expert testimony of police officer, who investigated
murder and had experience with gangs, that murder
benefited one gang because it promoted the respect of

that gang was sufficient to establish that murder wis
committed for the benefit of the gang, for purposes of
cnminal street gang enhancement People v. Olguin
(App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 31 CaLApp.4th
1355, rehearing denied, review denied.
Gang expert's opinion hearsay testimony that facts underlying prior convictions involved gang-related crimes
was insufficient to support convictions of criminal street
gang offenses and criminal street gang sentence enhancements; expert's testimony regarding facts underlying convictions not elicited in form of hypothetical question was
secondhand testimony which could not constitute substantial evidence that required predicate offense by gang
member occurred, and expert's opinion testimony elicited
in form of hypothetical questions was not supported by
competent evidence establishing existence of the facts
upon which the hypothetical questions were based People v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 CaLRptr .2d 136, 30
CaLApp.4th 402, 34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and
opinion superseded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115.
Enhancement of attempted murder defendant's sentence on ground that crime was committed in association
with criminal street gang was sufficiently supported by
evidence that predicate offenses committed by other gang
members were gang related and that intended victim of
instant offense was member of rival gang who had recently been involved in shooting of member of defendant's
gang. People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr.
894, 235 CaLApp3d 967.
Conclusional testimony that gang members had previously engaged in enumerated offenses, based on nonspecific hearsay and arrest information which does not specify exactly who, when, where, and under what circumstances gang crimes were committed, does not constitute
substantial evidence necessary for criminal street gang
sentencing enhancement Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dial
1991) 282 CaLRptr. 75, 230 CaLApp3d 1455, review denied
Where evidence failed to show that more than one
member of street gang engaged in commission or attempted commission of assault with a deadly weapon on particular occasion, although others were present, that incident
could not establish pattern of criminal gang activity required for enhancement of sentence pursuant to this
chapter. In re Nathi^iiel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279
CaLRptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
Evidence established proof of commission or attempted
commission of assault with a deadly weapon by a member
of street gang for purposes of sentence enhancement
pursuant to this chapter; evidence showed that one admitted member of gang was armed with segment of a stairway rail and that he got out of a van approximately 30 feet
away from members of another gang and gave chase while
still armed with the handrail and that he admitted that if
he had caught one of the other gang members, - I guess he
would have just got beat" In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1
Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
Police officer's testimony which consisted of only nonspecific hearsay of suspected shooting of one gang member by another was insufficient to establish predicate
offense for sentence enhancement pursuant to this chapter. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr.
236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
Evidence was not sufficient to support finding that
group infant participated with was a "criminal street
gang" and thus was not sufficient to support finding that
infant was guilty of offense of participation in a criminal
street gang; there was no evidence to show a pattern of
criminal gang activity by the infant's group, as there was
no evidence in record to establish that the charged offense
occurred within three years after a prior offense which
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was committed on a separate occasion, or by two or more
gang members. In re Lincoln J. (App. 2 Dist 1990) 272
Cal.Rptr. S52, 223 CaLApp.3d 322.
Infant's adjudication of guilt for offense of assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodDy injury could
Hot be enhanced under subd. (hXl) of this section, where
there was insufficient evidence to support finding of
M
criminal street gang." In re Lincoln J. (App. 2 Dist
1990) 272 CaLRptr. 862, 223 CaLApp^d 322.
In order for a criminal street gang sentence enhancement to be sustained the court must find the existence of
^CTiminal street gang" and the record must contain substantial evidence to support that finding. In re Lincoln J.
(App. 2 Dist 1990) 272 CaLRptr. 852, 223 CaLApp.3d 322.
"Expert testimony" by member of police department
youth gang task force that gang to which juvenile allegedly belonged had engaged in sale of rock cocaine, committed vehicle theft, and been involved in assault with deadly
Weapon was not substantial evidence that gang was engaged in "pattern of criminal gang activity"; testimony
Was based on nonspecific hearsay and arrest information
and fefl far short of requisite of this section. In re Leland
D. (App. 5 Dist 1990) 272 CaLRptr. 709, 223 CaLApp-3d
261.
9* Gang purposes or benefit
Evidence supported jury finding that murder was comntftted for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with specific intent to
Promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by
g&ng members and, thus, supported criminal street gang
enhancement; shooting was precipitated by crossing out
gkng graffiti, replacing it with the name of another gang,
**id then shouting that gang's name to rival gang member*. People v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 CaLRpd\2d
5$6, 31 CaLApp.4th 1366, rehearing denied, review denied
For purposes of statute setting forth punishment for
Person who actively participates in any criminal street
g*ng and willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any
felonious criminal conduct by members of a gang, a pattern of gang activity may include charged crime. People
v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 31
C*LApp.4th 1355, rehearing denied, review denied.
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when
st&te is seeking criminal street gang sentence enhancement, it must be shown that predicate crimes were gang
related, as statute requires prosecution to prove that gang
has as one of its primary activities the commission of one
or more of eight enumerated offenses. People v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 136. 30 CaLApp.4th
402, 34 CaLApp.4th 1614, review granted and opinion
superseded 39 Cal.Rp&\2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115.
Robbery, murder, and attempted murder of rival gang
number were committed for gang purposes within meaning of criminal 3treet gang sentence enhancement imposed
iu juvenile proc^-dmg; robbery was committed by jang
numbers for pun'ose of later drive-by shooting, and murder and attempted murder was directed at members of
rival gangs. Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282
Cal.Rptr. 75, 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, review denied
10. Bifurcation
defendant was not entitled to bifurcation of murder
tri^l and enhancement for gang activity; enhancement

5 186.22a.

concerned mental element present in commissioo in the
underlying crime, and same witnesses and much of same
evidence used to prove murder were also relevant to
establish circumstances and intent of killing. People v.
Martin (App. 6 Dist 1994) 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 23 CaL
App.4th 76, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied
After determining that evidence of gang affiliation and
activity was relevant to prove motive, malice, premeditation, and intent with respect to murder charge against
defendant, trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of nine prior incidents of intergang
retaliation; aD incidents, even those in which defendant
was not directly involved and those involving attacks by
rival S*ng, were relevant to issue of defendant's motive in
attacking member of rival gang. People v. Funes (App. 1
Dist 1994) 28 CaLRptrJW 758, 23 CaHpp.4th 1506, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied.
Evidence of defe: Want's gang affiliation and activity was
relevant to prove motive, malice, premeditation, and intent
with respect to murder charge against defendant, and trial
court ^as thus justified in denying motion to sever or
bifurcate gang affiliation charges from murder charge;
evidence regarding gang affiliation and activity directly
related to defendant's motive for attacking member of
rival g*ng, as well as his intent in doing so. People v.
Funes (App. 1 Dist 1994) 28 CaLRptr^d 758, 23 CaL
App.4th 1506, modified on denial of rehearing, review
denied
11. fnijtructionj
Jury could be presumed to have Mowed trial court's
instruction limiting use of hearsay about prior street gang
incident only to establish basis for expert's opinion, rather
than improperly relying on hearsay as evidence of predicate offepflp to establish pattern of criminal gang activity.
People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 CaLRpd\2d 160, 38
CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified review
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptrJZd 678, 899
P.2d64.
Instruction defining "pattern of criminal gang activity"
within meaning of Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act did not have to include a requirement that
gang's Criminal actions amount to or pose the threat of
continued criminal activity. People v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist
1994) 37 CaLRptr 2d 596, 31 CaLApp.4th 1355, rehearing
denied, review denied
12. Injunction
Whether California Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention (STEP) Act authorized injunction issued by
trial court to abate gang activity was not an issue, even if
trial court relied on Act in error, since city, in requesting
injunction, based its complaint only on public nuisance
law. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40
Ca}.Hptr2d 589, 34 CalAppAth 136, review granted and
opinion Superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 680, 899 P2d 66.
CalifoFnia Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STl£P) Act is not exclusive means of enjoining street
gang activity. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist
1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 589, 34 CaL\pp.4th 136, review
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr.2d 680, 899
P.2d 66.

B u i l d i n g s or places used by criminal street g a n g s ; n u i s a n c e ; additional remedies;
c o n f i s c a t i o n o f firearms or deadly or dangerous w e a p o n s o w n e d or possessed by g a n g
members

(a) Every building or place used by members of a criiriinal street gang for the purpose of the
coinmission of the offenses listed in subdivision (c) of Section 186.22 or any offense involving dangerous or
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deadly weapons, burglary, or rape, and every building or place wherein or upon which that criminal
conduct by gang members takes place, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and
for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance.
(b) Any action for injunction or abatement filed pursuant to • • • subdivision (a) shall proceed
according to the provisions of Article 3 (commencing with Section 11570) of Chapter 10 of Division 10 of
the Health and Safety Code, except that all of the following shall apply:
(1) The court shall not assess a civil penalty against any person unless that person knew or should have
known of the unlawful acts.
(2) No order of eviction or closure may be entered.
(3) All injunctions issued shall be limited to those necessary to protect the health and safety of the
residents or the public or those necessary to prevent further criminal activity.
(4) Suit may not be filed until 30-day notice of the unlawful use or criminal conduct has been provided
to the owner by mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the last known address.
(c) No nonprofit or charitable organization which is conducting its affairs with ordinary care or skill,
and no governmental entity, shall be abated pursuant to • * • subdivisions (a) and (b).
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any aggrieved person from seeking any other remedy
provided by law.
(e) (1) Any firearm, ammunition which may be used with the firearm, or any deadly or dangerous
weapon which is owned or possessed by a member of a criminal street gang for the purpose of the
commission of any of the offenses listed in subdivision (c) of Section 186.22, or the commission of any
burglary or rape, may be confiscated by any law enforcement agency or peace officer.
(2) In those cases where a law enforcement agency believes that the return of the firearm, ammunition,
or deadly weapon confiscated pursuant to this subdivision, is or will be used in criminal street gang
activity or that the return of the item would be likely to result in endangering the safety of others, the
law enforcement agency shall initiate a petition in the superior court to determine if the item confiscated
should be returned or declared a nuisance.
(3) No firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon shall be sold or destroyed unless reasonable notice is
given to its lawful owner if his or her identity and address can be reasonably ascertained. The law
enforcement agency shall inform the lawful owner, at that person's last known address by registered
mail, that he or she has 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice to respond to the court clerk to
confirm his or her desire for a hearing and that the failure to respond shall result in a default order
forfeiting the confiscated firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon as a nuisance.
(4) If the person requests a hearing, the court clerk shaD set a hearing no later than 30 days from
receipt of that request The court clerk shall notify the person, the law enforcement agency involved, and
the district attorney of the date, time, and place of the hearing.
(5) At the hearing, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency or peace officer to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the seized item is or will be used in criminal street gang activity or
that return of the item would be likely to result in endangering the safety of others. All returns of
firearms shall be subject to subdivision (d) of Section 12072.
(6) If the person does not request a hearing within 30 days of the notice or the lawful owner cannot be
ascertained, the law enforcement agency may file a petition that the confiscated firearm, ammunition, or
deadly weapon be declared a nuisance. If the items are declared to be a nuisance, the law enforcement
agency shall dispose of the items as provided in Section 12028.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988. Amended by Stats.1990, c. 223 (A.B.3485), § 1;
Stats.1991, c. 260 (S.B.809), § 1.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1990 Legislation
The 1990 amendment deleted u, other than residential
buildings in which there are three or fewer dwelling
units," twice in subd. (a) following "building or other
place".
1991 Legislation
The 1991 amendment in subd. (b) substituted "subdivision (af for "this section"; in subd. (c) substituted "subdi-

visions (a) and (b)" for "this chapter"; and added subd le)
relating to confiscation of firearms or deadly or dangerous
weapons owned or possessed by criminal street gang
members.
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Law Review Commentaries

Review of selected 1990 California legislation. 22 Pac.
LJ. 501 vl991).

Review of selected 1991 California legislation. 23 Pac.
LJ. 667 (1992).

Library References
California Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant, Friedman,
Garcia & Hagarty, see Guide's Table of Statutes for

chapter paragraph number references to paragraphs
discussing this section.

§ 186.23. Mutual aid activities; labor organizations
This chapter does not apply to employees engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid and
protection, or the activities of labor organizations or their members or agents.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, see Government Code
§ 9605.
Library References
California Jury Instructions—Criminal [CALJIC],
S 186.24.

Severability

If any part or provision of this chapter, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the chapter, including the application of that part or provision to other persons
or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby and shall continue in full force and effect To this end, the
provisions of this chapter are severable.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, 3ee Government Code
§ 9605.
§ 186.25.

Local laws; preemption

Nothing in this chapter shall prevent a local governing body from adopting and enforcing laws
consistent with this chapter relating to gangs and gang violence. Where local laws duplicate or
supplement this chapter, this chapter shall be construed as providing alternative remedies and not as
preempting the field.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, see Government Code
§ 9605.
§ 186.26.

Criminal street gang; violent coercion to participate; offense

(a) Any adult who utilizes physical violence to coerce, induce, or solicit another person who is under 18
years of age to actively participate in any criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section
186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of
Section 186.22, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years.
(b) Any adult who threatens a minor with physical violence on two or more separate occasions within
any 30-day period with the intent to coerce, induce, or solicit the minor to actively participate in a
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criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, the members of which engage in a
pattern of criminal gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years or in a county jail for up to one year.
(c) A minor who is 16 years of age or older who commits an offense described in subdivision (a) or (b)
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit prosecution'under any other provision of the law.
(e) No person shall be convicted of violating this section based upon speech alone, except upon a
showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person, that the defendant had the
apparent ability to carry out the threat, and that physical harm was imminently likely to occur.
(Added by Stats.1993, c. 567 (AB.514), § 1.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
19S8 Legislation
Addition of § 186.26 as part of Chapter 11, Street
Terrorism Enforcement And Prevention Act, added by
Stats. 1988, c. 1242, § 1, failed to become operative due to
addition of Chapter 11, Street Terrorism Enforcement
And Prevention Act, by Stata.1988, c 1256, § 1. See
Gov.C. § 9605.
§ 186.27.

Provisions similar to those contained in § 186J26 were
contained in § 5 of Stats.1988, c. 1256. See Historical
Note under § 186.20.
1992 Legislation
Addition of this section by § 1 of Stats.1992, c. 920
(A.B.2717), failed to become operative under the provisions of § 2 of that Act

Duration of chapter

This chapter shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and as of that date is repealed, unless a
later enacted statute, which is chaptered before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends that date.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eft Sept. 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eft Sept 26, 1988.
Amended by Stats.1991, c. 201 (A.B.1135), § 2.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
sarre session of the legislature, see Government Code

§ 186*28.

1991 Legislation
The 1991 amendment substituted "1997" for "1992" as
the year for repeal of the chapter.

Firearms; supply, sell or give possession; participation in criminal street gangs

(a) Any person, corporation, or firm who shall knowingly supply, sell, or give possession or control of
any firearm to another shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail for a
term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine
and imprisonment if all of the following apply:
(1) The person, corporation, or firm has actual knowledge that the person will use the firearm to
commit a felony described in subdivision (e) of Section 18622, while actively participating in any criminal
street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of
criminal activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 18622.
(2) The firearm is used to commit the felony.
(3) A conviction for the felony violation under subdivision fe) of Section 186.22 has first been obtained
of the person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control pursuant to this
section.
Oo) This section shall only be applicable where the person is not convicted as a principal to the felony
offense committed by the person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control
pursuant to this section.
(Added by Stats.1992, c. 370 (S.B.437), § 1.)
Cross References
Firearms, supply, sell, or give possession to person
participating in criminal street gangs, 3ee Penal Code
§ 186.28.
Law Review Commentaries
Review of selected 1992 California legislation. 24 Pac
LJ. 755 (1993).

